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RECENT CASES
Advertising-Undisclosed Use of Simulations In
Television Commercials-a Deceptive Practice
Colgate-Palmolive Co. purported to prove to its television audience
the moisturizing qualities of Palmolive Rapid Shave by demonstrating
its effectiveness on "tough, dry sandpaper." In fact, rather than
sandpaper, a mock-up1 of sand on plexiglass was used for demon-
stration purposes. Colgate-Palmolive maintained that the prop was
necessary because of a principal difficulty inherent in television
photography-real sandpaper is indistinguishable from smooth colored
paper. The Federal Trade Commission held the commercial false
and deceptive 2 in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.3 It found that since Rapid Shave could not shave sand-
paper within the time depicted in the advertisement, respondents
had misrepresented the produces moisturizing power. Moreover, the
undisclosed use of plexiglass was, in itself, an additional material
misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals sustained the conclusion
that the respondents had misrepresented the qualities of Rapid Shave,
but set aside the Commission's cease-and-desist order forbidding the
future use of any undisclosed simulations in television commercials. 4
On may 7, 1963, the Commission issued a new order to comply with
the court's ruling.5 The Court of Appeals again found that portion of
the order dealing with simulated props unsatisfactory and, accord-
ingly, refused to enforce it.0 Granting certiorari,7 the United States
Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded for the entry of a
1. In advertising, a "prop" or "mock-up" is an object or device used in a television
commercial for a particular purpose relevant to the commercial message. Frequently, it
is something made solely for use in the commercial and often it is made to simulate a
real object. Any minor differences between a "prop" and "mock-up" are irrelevant
for purposes here. Note, 72 YALE L.J. 145 n.2 (1962).
2. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 3 TRADE REG. RE'P. 11 15643 (1961).
3. "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1958).
4. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962).
5. The principal section of this new order narrowed the "genuine and accurate"
standard of the former directive to prohibit respondents from "Advertising any product
by presenting a visual test or demonstration represented to be actual proof of a claim
made for the product, where the test or demonstration does not constitute actual proof
because a mock-up or a substitute material or article is used in the test or demon-
stration instead of the genuine material or article represented to be used therein."
Colgate-Palmolive Co. and Ted Bates & Co., Inc., No. 7736, FTC Proposed Final
Order, Feb. 18, 1963. (Emphasis added.)
6. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 517 (6th Cir. 1963).
7. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 377 U.S. 942 (1964).
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judgment enforcing the Commission's order. The undisclosed use
of simulations in television commercials to prove a product claim
is a material deceptive practice, independent and separate from any
other misrepresentation, and may be prohibited by the Federal Trade
Commission. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
The Federal Trade Commission derives its general powers to regu-
late advertising from section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.8
Originally, this prevented the Commission's acting upon false adver-
tising unless it was likely to injure competitors of the advertiser.9
In 1938, however, Congress passed the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, 10
extending the authority of the FTC to "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce."" An examination of subsequent non-
television advertising cases clearly indicates that some actual or
potential injury to competitors or consumers has been the determina-
tive factor in finding deception. 12 However, in deciding the question
of the proper use of mock-ups in television commercials, the Com-
mission has failed to focus upon the effect produced by the misrepre-
8. See note 3 supra.
9. Raladam Co. v. FTC, 42 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1930) aff'd on other grounds, 283
U.S. 643 (1931).
10. 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1958).
11. The legislative history of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment clearly indicates that
the acts intended to be proscribed were those which cause or threaten to cause injury
to the consumer: "[T]his amendment makes the consumer, who may be injured by
an unfair trade practice, of equal concern before the law, with the merchant or
manufacturer injured by the methods of a dishonest competitor." H.R. REP. No. 1613,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937). See also 83 CONG. REC. 391-92 (1938) (remarks of
Congressman Lea); Note, supra note 1, at 146 n.1.
12. Four general types of injuries have been prohibited by the Federal Trade
Commission Act. First, advertising claims which conceal latent dangers or mislead the
consumer into believing that a potentially dangerous product is entirely safe have been
held illegal. Gelb v. FTC, 144 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944). Second, advertising claims which
might induce a consumer to make a purchase expecting to acquire something better than
the product being offered have been held illegel. Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 268
F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959); Houbigant, Inc. v. FTC, 139
F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 763 (1944); Capon Water Co. v. FTC, 107
F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1939). Included in this category is the testimonial advertisement
where a consumer is induced to purchase a product because of an opinion by someone
he respects. Howe v. FTC, 148 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1945); Moretrench Corp. v. FTC,
127 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1942). Third, advertising claims tending to create a false
impression about the product and thereby motivate the consumer to make a particular
purchase, regardless of whether he ultimately acquires all he expected, have been
held illegal. Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246 (10th Cir. 1959); Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC,
262 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1959). Fourth, misleading advertisements which involve
injuries to competitors who do not indulge in such advertising practices have been
held illegal. Steelco Stainless Steel, Inc. v. FTC, 187 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1951);
Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941). See also Note, supra note 1,
at 148-50.
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sentation. Rather, the tendency has been to emphasize the subject
matter or devices employed.13
In the principal case, the basic issue before the Court was whether
it is a deceptive trade practice, prohibited by section 5, to represent
falsely that a televised test, experiment or demonstration provides
a viewer with visual proof of a product claim, regardless of whether
the product claim is itself true.14 The parties agreed that section 5
prohibits 'the intentional misrepresentation of any fact which would
constitute a material factor in a purchaser's decision to buy, but they
differed in their conception of what "facts" constitute "a material
factor."I Respondents argued that the only material facts are those
which deal with the substantive qualities of the product: "A buyer's
real concern is with the truth of the substantive claims or promises
made to him, not with the means used to make them." 6 The Court,
however, sustained the conclusions of the FTC to the effect that the
misrepresentation of any fact which materially induces a purchaser's
decision to buy is a deception prohibited by section 5.17 It found a
strong similarity between the present case and those cases in which
a seller induced the public to purchase his product either by mis-
representing his line of business, by concealing the fact that the
product was reprocessed, or by misappropriating another's trade-
13. These cases fall generally into three main categories: (1) Use of props or mock-
ups to communicate non-existent facts about the product or the manufacturer. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., TRADE REG. REP., 1960-61 F.T.C. Complaints and Orders f1 28,947
(formation of invisible shield around teeth by use of toothpaste); Max Factor & Co.,
55 F.T.C. 1328 (1959), Complaint, 1957-58 F.T.C. Complaints and Orders f 27,510
("Natural Wave" creates a "natural" curl in hair); American Chicle Co., 54 F.T.C.
1625 (1958), Complaint, 1957-58 F.T.C. Complaints and Orders ff26,501
("Rolaids" are endorsed by the medical profession). (2) Use of props or mock-ups
to distort results of comparative tests. Carter Products, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1
15,859 (1962) ("Rise Shaving Cream" is more moist than Brand X); The Mennan
Co., 3 TRADE REG. Ri. ff 15,133 (1961) ("Sof' Stroke" has more consistency than
competitive brand-"undervater test"); Aluminum Co. of America, 3 TRADE REG. REP. ff
25,448 (1961) (aluminum foil keeps ham fresher than competitive foil). (3) Use of
props or mock-ups in tests or demonstrations that do not prove what is purported.
Standard Brands, Inc., 1960-61 F.T.C. Complaints and Orders f 28,819, Complaint,
1959-60 F.T.C. Complaints and Orders II 28,491 (1960) ("moisturizing drops" prove
that margarine tastes better than butter); Eversharp, Inc. 1960-61 Complaints and
Orders II 29,094 (1960), Complaint, 1959-60 F.T.C. Complaints and Orders ff 28,627
(smooth shave for boxing glove proves smooth shave for person); Brown & Williams
Tobacco Corp. 1959-60 F.T.C. Complaints and Orders II 28,631, Complaint, id. at
ff 28,491 (1960) (absorbtion of liquid proves that Life cigarette's "Millicel Filter" will
absorb tar and nicotine); Hutchinson Chemical Corp., 55 F.T.C. 1942 (1959) ("flaming
auto" commercial to prove that car wax could withstand extreme heat and cold). See 37
NoTRE DA~M LAw. 524 (1962); Note, supra note 1, at 151 n.34.
14. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 375-76 (1965).
15. Id. at 386.
16. Brief for Respondent, FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., p. 20, supra note 14.
17. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 14, at 387.
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mark.18 In each, the primary objective is to persuade the buyer to
change his habit of avoiding unknown brand names and reprocessed
goods. The seller reasons that when this habit is once broken, the
consumer will be satisfied with the performance of the product he
receives. Yet, misrepresentation to achieve such an end is not per-
missible.' 9 In answer to the respondent's objection that the Com-
mission's decision discriminates against sellers whose product claims
cannot be "verified" through the television media without the use
of simulations, the Court said that "if the inherent limitations of a
method do not permit its use in the way a seller desires, the seller
cannot by material misrepresentation compensate for those limita-
tions."20 Distinguishing the present situation from those in which
the use of a prop is not employed for additional proof of the product
claim,2 ' the Court concluded that an undisclosed mock-up which
gives the viewer objective proof of the claims made is illegal. 22 To
prevent respondents from engaging in similarly illegal practices in
future advertisements, the Court sustained the broad cease-and-
desist order of the Commission. The crucial term-"test, experiment
or demonstration ... represented ... as actual proof of a claim"-are
as specific as the circumstances will permit.23
Although it appears at first glance that the Supreme Court has
failed to focus upon the harmful effects of the misrepresentation,
thereby ignoring the alleged purpose of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act,24 a closer examination reveals that this is
not the case. Admittedly, there is no injury peculiar to the con-
sumer,25 but misrepresentation does result in a threat of injury to
those competitors not using undisclosed simulations in television com-
mercials.26 As the Court points out, "the present case is not concerned
with a mode of communication, but with a misrepresentation that
viewers have objective proof of a seller's product claim over and
above the seller's word."27 This, of course, was found to violate
section 5. The Court's primary concern was with unfair competition.
All three of the cases relied upon28 placed strong emphasis on the
18. Id. at 388-89.
19. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934).
20. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 14, at 391.
21. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
22. The Court said, "In the ice cream case the mashed potato prop is not being
used for additional proof of the product claim, while the purpose of the Rapid Shave
commercial is to give the viewer objective proof of the claims made."- Id. at 393.
23. Ibid.
24. See note 11 supra.
25. The Court said that the present case dealt "with methods designed to get a
consumer to purchase a product, not with whether the product, when purchased, will
perform up to expectations." See Note, supra note 1, at 159.
26. See notes 18 & 19 supra and accompanying text.
27. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 14, at 388.
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injury suffered by the competitor. In FTC v. Raladam Co.,29 the
Court concluded,
It is not necessary that the evidence show specifically that losses to any
particular trader or traders arise from Raladam's success in capturing part
of the market. One of the objects of the Act creating the Federal Trade
Commission was to prevent potential injury by stopping unfair methods of
competition in their incipiency.30
In the instant case, the visual experimental proof that Rapid Shave
could shave sandpaper was a material inducement to the potential
consumer. Because an undisclosed mock-up was substituted for sand-
paper, there was a misrepresentation to the public that it was being
given objective proof of a product claim. The consequent injury was
suffered by those competitors of Colgate-Palmolive having a product
which could in fact shave sandpaper, but who refrained from so
demonstrating because of the aforementioned television technical-
ities.31 The Wheeler-Lea Amendment did not abandon protection to
the competitor, but rather expanded the authority of the FTC to
include protection of the consumer.32 The present decision, therefore,
is clearly within the scope of section 5.
Yet, whether the Supreme Court, in an effort to avoid one type of
injury to the competitor has created a danger of yet another form of
discrimination against the seller whose product claims cannot be
"verified" .on television without the use of simulations, remains un-
answered. This is probably not the case since the present holding
places all competitors on an equal footing. If one is unable to sub-
stitute an undisclosed prop in the commercial, his competitors are
equally inhibited. The "blue towel" to demonstrate whiteness,
"mashed potatoes" to portray the rich texture of ice cream, and "red
wine" to prove the finer qualities of coffee, must now be fully
identified before being employed.m3 Further, there is no discrimination
where competition exists through a "cross-elasticity" of demand, as
that between a dessert such as ice cream, which cannot be televised,
and other desserts, such as candy or pastries, which face no technical
problems with television.-4 Such competition does not require proof of
28. FTC v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149 (1942); FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., supra
note 19; FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933).
29. Supra note 28.
30. Id. at 152.
31. See notes 1 & 2 supra and accompanying text.
32. "By the proposed amendment to section 5, the Commission can prevent such
acts or practices which injuriously affect the general public as well as those which are
unfair to competitors." H.R. RF'. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937) (Emphasis
added.)
33. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
34. Note, supra note 1, at 159 n.49.
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product claims. The seller merely needs to place his product before
the public, and the Court expressly permits the undisclosed use of
props for such purposes.m "Clearly .. .a commercial which depicts
happy actors delightedly eating ice cream that is in fact mashed
potatoes ... is not covered by the present order."36 Only when sellers
are competing for the market in the same product is it essential to
portray objective proof of product claims.
It is true that the Supreme Court, in sustaining this order, has by-
passed- an unsettled area of technical difficulties. Advertisers are still
left without specific guidelines as to the scope of permissibility in the
use of simulations. However, just as in the past, the Court may be
expected to clarify its initially broad pronouncement in future litiga-
tion.
Antitrust Law-News Service Package Contract,
a Tying Arrangement under Section I
of the Sherman Act
Associated Press is a non-profit corporation organized in New York
and engaged in collecting and disseminating news among its member
publishers and broadcasters.' Being the largest independent news
gathering agency in the United States, it has only one major competi-
tor, United Press International.2  Associated Press had for several
35. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 14, at 393.
36. Ibid.
1. The membership of Associated Press includes newspapers, magazines, and radio
and television stations. The breadth of its organization is indicated by the following
footnote to the opinion in the instant case: "AP has approximately 250,000 miles of
leased news wire connecting most of the cities of the United States. This network
of wires is leased by AP from the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and
the Western Union Telegraph Company. In each AP office and in the office of each
AP member where there are AP employees, there is one transmitting machine and one
receiving machine attached to each circuit for the purpose of transmitting and receiving
news on the circuit. Each member that uses this kind of equipment leases it from AP
and pays AP for it. There are approximately 43 metropolitan areas throughout the
country including Cincinnati, which are considered by AP to be 'trunk point cities.'
These cities make up the major newspaper markets of the United States.
"News originating in the United States is not sent to a single point, but is trans-
mitted to AlP members directly from the AP news bureau in the area in which the
news originates. News from abroad is sent to AP offices in New York, from which it
is transmitted throughout the United States. Leased wire services furnished to news-
papers in smaller cities are transmitted over a single circuit, and to members in large
cities over multiple circuits . . .' commonly called trunks, [which] have come into
existence because, under present technology, it is impossible to transmit all state,
national and international news on one circuit."' Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp.,
340 F.2d 753, 6 n.758 (6th Cir.,), cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 47 (1965).
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years3 supplied Taft-Ingalls, 4 a member Ohio corporation publishing
the Cincinnati Times-Star, with its basic wire service. Included in
this service were four wire circuits, called "trunks," each of which
carried primarily one category of news, i.e., stories of general interest,
financial stories, et cetera.5 In 1948 Associated Press and Taft-Ingalls
had entered into a contract which provided that Taft-Ingalls would
continue to subscribe to and pay assessments for this basic service
until the contract was terminated by either party on two years notice.
There was a further provision that in the event of sale of its publica-
tion, Taft-Ingalls was to require its successor to assume its obligations
under that contract and to apply for membership in the Associated
Press. Beginning in 1957, however, Taft-Ingalls, faced with an operat-
ing deficit, undertook a cost reduction program. Pursuant to that
program, it applied to Associated Press for an across-the-board re-
duction in its membership assessment. That request was denied.
Taft-Ingalls responded by requesting that Associated Press furnish to
it only the Ohio Big Cities Circuit,6 which Taft-Ingalls considered the
most necessary of the four trunks it had been receiving. The Asso-
ciated Press again refused, stating that if Taft-Ingalls desired the Ohio
Big Cities Circuit, it would have to continue to pay the unit price
for the basic, four-wire service. One year later, on July 19, 1958,
Taft-Ingalls discontinued publication of the Cincinnati Times-Star
and sold the paper without requiring its successor to assume the
contract with Associated Press as it had agreed to do. On the same
day it notified Associated Press of its cancellation. Thereafter, no
services were furnished by Associated Press and no further payments
were made by Taft-Ingalls. Associated Press brought this action in a
United States District Court 7 to recover assessments for the two-year
2. United Press and International News Service merged into United Press Interna-
tional in 1957.
3. Taft-Ingalls has been a member of Associated Press since the latter was organized
in 1900. The use of multiple circuits was initiated by the larger city newspapers
sometime prior to the contract in question here, though the record is not clear as to
the precise date.
4. Prior to the sale of its newspaper, the name of appellant was The Cincinnati
Times-Star Company. Contemporaneously with the sale its name was changed to
Taft-Ingalls Corporation. 340 F.2d at 755 n.1
5. The four wire services were described by Associated Press's Chief of Bureau at
Columbus: "'A' trunk circuit. This is a general news wire carrying stories of top
general interest. 'D' trunk circuit. This circuit carries financial stories, commodity
quotations and other business news. Ohio Big Cities Circuit. This circuit carries Ohio,
regional and general news copy. Kentucky Regional. Two circuits, one operating in
TTS style, one in all-caps, deliver Kentucky state news." Id. at 756-57.
6. See ibid.
7. Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., unreported memorandum opinion, filed
with Clerk of United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, April 5, 1963. The entire
opinion is reproduced in Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 323 F.2d 114 (6th
Cir. 1963).
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period following that cancellation. Taft-Ingalls counterclaimed alleg-
ing that the contract was a tying arrangement unlawful under section
1 of the Sherman Act8 because it was being used by Associated Press
to require member newspapers in key metropolitan areas to receive
and pay for all its basic services as a condition for receiving any one
of them. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
from a judgment for Associated Press,9 held, reversed. Since the Ohio
Big Cities Circuit was separable on a cost basis from the other three
trunks in Associated Press's basic package and possessed sufficient
uniqueness and consumer desirability to enable Associated Press to
force Taft-Ingalls to continue to receipt of the three trunks in order to
receive the Ohio Big Cities Circuit, the package contract was a tying
arrangement, unlawful per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 85 Sup. Ct. 47 (1965).
This case presents a unique combination of Sherman Act issues,
though, individually, each of the issues presented has been litigated
before. There is no longer any doubt that Associated Press, despite
its function as an integral part of our free press, is subject to the
provisions of the Sherman Act.'0 Some doubt does remain, however, as
to the treatment that Associated Press will be given under Section 1
of that act. In Associated Press v. United States," the Supreme Court
affirmed a district court decree enjoining the enforcement of certain
Associated Press by-laws controlling membership, "Interpreting the
8. "§ 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or othervise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal .... ." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1964). "§ 4. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
9. The district court held that Taft-Ingalls had failed to establish that the cost of
transmitting over the various trunks was separable. Therefore, a violation of the
Sherman Act as a defense or a counterclaim could not be established. The court in
the instant case affirmed the district court's decision as to the counterclaim for treble
damages, since the evidence of damages was "too speculative." 340 F.2d at 769.
10. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). The Court relied on
two earlier cases. In Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub-
lishing Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934), it was held that the publisher of a newspaper had
no special immunity by virtue of the first amendment from the application of general
laws which did not purport to censor news or control editorial policies. To establish
Congress' jurisdiction over the Associated Press, the Court relied on Associated Press
v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937), wherein it was held that the exchange of news
between publishers-though not for profit-amounted to "commerce" and that pub-
lishers exchanging news throughout the country are "engaged in interstate commerce
within the ...meaning of Article I, § 8 of the Constitution." Id. at 128.
11. Supra note 10.
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decree to mean that AP news is to be furnished to competitors of
old members without discrimination through By-Laws controlling
membership, or otherwise .... -12 The Delphic "or otherwise," together
with language recognizing that the size and dominant position of
Associated Press as a news gathering agency rendered access to its
services as "indispensable" requisite to effective competition with its
members, 13 could be said to indicate a "public utility" approach to
the Associated Press.14 However, the Court expressly denied using a
public utility concept: "we merely hold that arrangements or combina-
tions designed to stifle competition cannot be immunized by adopting
a membership device accomplishing that purpose."'5 No subsequent
case has resolved the doubt arising from the Court's 1945 treatment of
the Associated Press.
Tying arrangements are not a new subject of litigation under section
1 of the Sherman Act.16 In general, a tying arrangement is an agree-
ment by a party to sell one (tying) product only on the condition that
the buyer also purchase a different (tied) product."7 Such an agree-
ment may suppress competition in two ways. First, if the seller has
sufficient economic power in the market for the tying product, the
use of a tying arrangement may restrict competition on the merits in
the market for the tied product.18 This results because the customer
12. Id. at 21.
13. "[T]he argument . . . that AP had not yet achieved a complete monopoly is
wholly irrelevant." Id. at 13. "[Tjhe fact that an agreement to restrain trade does
not inhibit competition in all of the objects of that trade cannot save it from the
condemnation of the Sherman Act. It is apparent that the exclusive right to publish
news in a given field, furnished by AP and all of its members, gives many newspapers
a competitive advantage over their rivals. Conversely, a newspaper without AP service
is more than likely to be at a competitive disadvantage. . . . 'AP is a vast, intricately
reticulated organization, the largest of its kind, gathering news from all over the world,
the chief single source of news for the American Press, universally agreed to be of
great consequence."' Id. at 17-18. "Inability to buy news from the largest news
agency, or any one of its multitude of members, can have most serious effects on the
publication of competitive newspapers. . . . 'It is practically impossible for any one
newspaper alone to establish or maintain the organization requisite for collecting all
of the news of the world, or any substantial part thereof; aside from the administrative
and organization difficulties thereof, the financial cost is so great that no single news-
paper acting alone could sustain it."' Id. at 13 n.10.
14. Compare United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). But see
Associated Press v. United States, supra note 10, at 23, 25 (Douglas, J. concurring).
15. Id. at 19. But see id. at 25 (Douglas, J. concurring), as follows: "Only if a
monopoly were shown to exist would we be faced with the public utility theory which
has been much discussed in connection with this case and adopted by Mi. Jusrxcr
FRANKIErM."
16. For an excellent review of the early development of the law in this area, see
Baldwin & McFarland, Tying Arrangements in Law and Economics, 8 ANTrrhUST BULL.
743 (1963).
17. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
18. In Northern Pacific Ry. the Court said: "[T]he vice of tying arrangements lies
in the use of economic power in one market to restrict competition on the merits in
another .... " Id. at 11.
2016 [ VOL. 18
RECENT CASES
who finds it necessary to purchase the tying product is forced to
take the tied product from the same seller regardless of whether that
particular tied product is the best of its kind available. Second, to
the extent that such restriction actually takes place, competitors are
foreclosed from the market for the tied product.19 Thus, a tying
arrangement may constitute an unreasonable restraint on interstate
commerce and may thereby be found unlawful under the traditional
tests of detriment to the public interest which section 1 of the Sherman
Act has been interpreted to require:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the busi-
ness to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained,
are all relevant facts.
20
Such an elaborate analysis, however, is not always necessary. Under
certain circumstances tying arrangements may be unlawful per se.
Accordingly, where a party engaging in a tying arrangement has
"sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on
free competition in the tied product" and a "not insubstantial" amount
of interstate commerce is affected, the arrangement may be found
unlawful without an elaborate analysis of the unreasonableness of
the restraint.21 The phrase "sufficient economic power to impose an
19. In International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947), the
Court stated: "[I]t is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any sub-
stantial market." Essentially, this is merely the other side of the coin with respect to
the first point. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. In many of the early tying
arrangement cases, involving the use of a patented product-or other product over
which the seller had a legal monopoly-as a tie-in with another product, the only
reason given for holding the arrangement unlawful, was that it foreclosed competing
sellers from the market for the tied product. Baldwin & McFarland, supra note 16, at
748-50. Wrongful abdication of consumer judgment in the market for the tied product
is a rationale which has developed concurrently with the application of the tying
arrangement principle to situations in which the actual market foreclosure is less
significant. Compare International Salt Co. v. United States, supra, with Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 17.
20. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See also Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614-24 (1953).
21. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 17, at 11. The development of
the per se doctrine in the tying cases is interesting. It originated in International Salt
Co. v. United States, supra note 19, where, in answer to International's contention that
summary judgment was unauthorized because it precluded a trial of issues of fact as to
whether the restraint was unreasonable, the Court said: "[I]t is unreasonable, per se,
to foreclose competitors from any substantial market. . . .The volume of business
affected by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstantial and the
tendency of the arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious." Id. at
2017
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appreciable restraint on free competition .in the tied product" has
received significant judicial interpretation. As interpreted, the phrase
is essentially equivalent to the economist's notion of "market lever-
age."22  Clearly, a position of "dominance" in the market for the
tying product will establish the existence of "sufficient economic
power"-dominance being defined as power to control price and to
exclude competition.2 Sufficient power has also been inferred from
the existence of a large number of tying agreements, at least where
the agreements involve no benefit for the consumer and no other
explanation for their existence can be given.2 Even the uniqueness
396. In the years immediately following this decision, there remained much confusion
as to the scope of the per se rule. Then in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. Unitcd
States, supra note 20, the Court attempted to dispel the confusion: "From the 'tying'
cases a perceptible pattern of illegality emerges: When the seller enjoys a
monopolistic position in the market for the 'tying' product, or if a substantial
volume of commerce in the 'tied' product is restrained, a tying arrangement
violates the narrower standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act because
from either factor the requisite potential lessening of competition is inferred.
And because for even a lawful monopolist it is 'unreasonable, per se, to foreclose
competitors from any substantial market,' a tying arrangement is banned by § 1 of
the Sherman Act whenever both conditions are met." Id. at 608-09. Whatever sense
of comfort was derived by those who read the Times-Picayune opinion as a definitive
statement of the law, it was short lived. Within five years the Supreme Court changed
its position significantly. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 17. In
holding that Northern Pacific had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by leasing
and selling tracts of land, initially granted to it by Congress, on the condition that
certain "preferential routing" clauses be included in the contracts and leases, the
Court said: "While there is some language in the Times-Picayune opinion 'which
speaks of 'monopoly power' or 'dominance' over the tying product as a necessary
precondition for application of the rule of per se unreasonableness to tying arrange-
ments, we do not construe this general language as requiring anything more than
sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in
the tied product (assuming all the time, of course, that a 'not insubstantial' amount of
interstate commerce is affected)." Id. at 11. The impact of this statement is most
clearly, seen by its application to the facts of that case. The Court conceded that
Northern Pacific did not enjoy a "monopolistic" or "dominant" position in real estate in
the several Northwestern states (the tying product); under the Times-Picayune case,
therefore, the per se rule would not have been applicable. However, the Court in
Northern Pacific based its finding of "sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable
restraint on free competition in the tied product" merely on its finding that a large
number of the tying arrangements were in existence: "The very existence of this host
of tying arrangements is itself compelling evidence of the defendant's great power, at
least where, as here, no other explanation has been offered for the existence of these
restraints. The 'preferential routing' clauses conferred no benefit on the purchasers or
lessees.... [D]efendant makes no claim that it came any cheaper than if the restrictive
clauses had been omitted .... So far as the Railroad was concerned its purpose obviously
was to fence out competitors, to stifle competition. . . . In short, we are convinced
that the essential prerequisites for treating the defendant's tying arrangements as
unreasonable 'per se' were conclusively established below and that the defendant has
offered to prove nothing there or here which would alter this conclusion." Id. at 7-8.
22. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19
(1957).
23. This is clear from the evolution of the phrase. See note 21 supra.
24. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 17, at 7-8.
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of the tying product or its desirability to the consumer may be the
basis for inferring sufficient economic power.25 In contrast to the
abundance of judicial comment on the requirement of sufficient
economic power, there has been virtually none on the requirement
that a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce be affected.
This is explained in part by the absence, in the majority of the tying
arrangements to come before the court, of any real doubt that a
substantial amount of interstate commerce was affected.26 The per se
approach had been justified on the ground that tying arrangements
"serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition."2 7
Apparently, though, a strict application of the per se rule may be fore-
gone if the tying arrangement is used to accomplish some legitimate
objective which could not be accomplished by some other means.
For example, even where the two requirements for the per se rule
are met, the use of tying arrangements by a small company trying to
break into a market may be permissible in order to protect the
integrity of a novel (tying) product.28 Such justifications have not
been readily accepted by the Court, however, once the two pre-
requisites for the per se rule have been established.2
9
25. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). Market dominance-some
power to control price and to exclude competition-is by no means the only test of
whether the seller has the requisite economic power. Even absent a showing of
market dominance, the crucial economic power may be inferred from the tying
product's desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes." Id. at 45.
26. A brief review of the cases will bear this out. In International Salt Co. v.
United States, supra note 19, the first case to apply the per se rule to tying arrange-
ments, the Court seemed to base its holding that the volume of business affected was
not insubstantial or insignificant on its finding that in 1944, appellant sold approxi-
mately 119,000 tons of salt (the tied product), for about $500,000, for use in machines
(the tying product). Id. at 395-96. In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131 (1948), the Court did not concern itself with the problem. Similarly, in
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, supra note 21, the Court assumed
without deciding, that the test had been met. Id. at 610 n.28. In Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, supra note 17, the Court could see no "real doubt that a 'not
insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce was . . . affected...." Id. at 7. Of
course, in that case the Court had found that many of the goods produced on the land
(the tying product) would be shipped from one state to another on Northern Pacific's
lines (the tied product). Id. at 3. Finally, in United States v. Loew's, Inc., supra note
25, a substantial amount of commerce was obviously affected considering the dollar
amounts involved in the many contracts which, admittedly, extended across state lines.
Id. at 49.
27. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 17, at 6; Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States, supra note 20, at 605.
28. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,
187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). But cf. United
States v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 25, at 51-52.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 25, wherein the Court
rejected such a justification saying: "[T]ying arrangements, once found to exist in a
context of sufficient economic power, are illegal 'without elaborate inquiry as to . . .
the business excuse for their use .. " Id. at 52.
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One additional issue must be considered. According to the defini-
tion of a tying arrangement given above,30 the tying product must be
different, or distinct, from the tied product. This problem of product
differentiation was first dealt with in Times-Picayune Publishing Co.
v. United States.31 There the Court dismissed the contention that the
defendant had tied the sale of advertising space in its evening paper
to the sale of advertising space in its morning paper because "nothing
in the record ... [suggested] that advertisers viewed the city's news-
paper readers, morning or evening, as other than fungible customer
potential."32 Since purchasers of advertising space considered adver-
tising space in both papers identical, indistinguishable products, there
could be no tying arrangement.33 The instant case illustrates that
the problem of product differentiation, though seldom litigated,a4 could
be extremely difficult. Yet, certain aspects of this problem may be
reduced to general rules. Clearly, the two products (the tying and
tied product) do not have to be in entirely different product markets.
Particularly susceptible to unlawful tying arrangements are product
markets in which a distinct consumer appeal is inherent in each
unit. In the motion picture industry, for example, the practice of
block booking-offering to license one feature or group of features on
condition that the exhibitor also license another feature or group of
features-has been held an unlawful tying arrangement. 5 Even in a
product market in which distinct consumer appeal is not inherent in
each unit, if one such unit acquires a distinct appeal by virtue of
technological innovation or consumer orientation, the use of that unit
as a tie-in with another similar, though less desirable, unit might be
unlawful. For example, in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States,36 the Court implied that if the advertisers had considered
advertising space in a morning paper more essential to complete cus-
tomer coverage than advertising space in an evening paper, space in
each would have been treated as a separate product.31 On the issue
30. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
31. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
32. Id. at 613.
33. Id. at 614.
34. This problem is not to be confused with the "integrity of the product" defense.
See Note, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 1413 (1964). At times the distinction is hard to see.
See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., supra note 28. Product differentia-
tion is prerequisite to the very existence of any tying arrangement, legal or illegal.
The integrity of the product defense, however, raises the question whether an existing
tying arrangement is legal or illegal.
35. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra note 26. See also United States
v. Lowe's, Inc., supra note 25.
36. Supra note 20.
37. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. In fact, the Court could be criticised
for taking a naive conception of the advertiser's approach to newspaper coverage,
particularly in light of modern consumer analysis.
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of product differentiation, then, the crucial question is whether the
consumer has differentiated between the products involved.
In the instant case, after stating that a party to an illegal contract"cannot recover damages for the breach thereof,"38 the court com-
menced consideration of the Sherman Act issue. There was no doubt,
in view of Associated Press v. United States,39 that Associated Press
is subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act.40 The definition of a
tying arrangement as an "'agreement by a party to sell one product
but only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a different (or
tied) product,"'41 formed the basis for Associated Press's contention
that it was engaged in distributing only one product, news, and that
the news transmitted by it over the several trunks was so intermingled
that the several trunks were inseparable.4 In view of the limited
request made by Taft-Ingalls for separate services,43 the court felt that
it was necessary only to determine whether the Ohio Big Cities Circuit
was separable from the other three trunks.44 The court recognized
that product differentiation had rarely posed an issue before the
courts,45 but went on to review those cases which were regarded as
bearing on the problem.46 Associated Press relied in part upon the
district court finding that there was no "natural division in the cost of
gathering news transmitted over the . . . [various] trunks."4 This
finding, however, was held "clearly erroneous" with respect to the Ohio
Big Cities Circuit in view of Associated Press's quotation of charges for
38. 340 F.2d at 759.
39. Supra note 11.
40. 340 F.2d at 758.
41. Id. at 759. (Emphasis added.)
42. Id. at 759-60. Associated Press argued that establishment of multiple circuits, or
'trunks' (See supra note 1) did not imply that the news sent over one of those trunks
was separable from news sent over another trunk. To support this contention,
reference was made to the "spill over" method of transmission. See 340 F.2d at 763.
For example, while trunk 'A' may be used primarily to transmit stories of top general
interest, if that trunk should become overcrowded, some of the general interest stories
might be transmitted over trunk 'D,' which is normally used primarily to transmit
financial news. This "spill over," argued Associated Press, made all of the trunk lines
inseparable. Thus, the package contract was necessary for complete news coverage. The
court's answer was two-fold. In the first place Associated Press had not shown that
there was any "spill over" from the Ohio Big Cities Circuit to the other trunks in
the package. Id. at 763. Second, what Associate Press thought was necessary for
complete news coverage was not determinative. "In this situation, who better than ...
[Taft-Ingalls] was in a position to choose which wire services it needed and wanted
and to exercise independent judgment to that end?" Id. at 762.
43. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
44. 340 F.2d at 766.
45. Id. at 760.
46. Id. at 760-61. The court cited United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., supra
note 28; United States v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 25; and Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, supra note 20.
47. 340 F.2d at 765.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
separate trunks to non-member publishers,48 its practice of making
separate charges for other services to member publishers,49 and the
availability of a complete news service from United Press International
on less than a package basis.50 Morever, prior decisions, accord-
ing to the court, did not impose upon Taft-Ingalls the burden of
establishing a clear division of costs.5 ' Having found a tying arrange-
ment, there was little problem finding the requisites for the application
of the per se rule of unreasonableness. 52 Since Associated Press had a
quasi-property right in its news dispatches,5 3 those dispatches were
held to have a uniqueness suggesting "comparison with a monopoly
by patent."54 Furthermore, since Taft-Ingalls had been willing to
experience a "recurring operational deficit"5 5 by continuing its sub-
scription to Associated Press's entire package rather than give up the
Ohio Big Cities Circuit, "there ... [could] be no doubt of the desira-
bility of ... [the tying product]. 56 The court was, therefore, follow-
ing precedent in holding, on the basis of the uniqueness and desira-
bility of the tying product, that sufficient economic power was estab-
lished.5 7 The court also found that a "not insubstantial" amount of
interstate commerce was affected. Of course, in Associated Press v.
48. 340 F.2d at 766. In 1958 after it had purchased the Cincinnati Times-Star from
Taft-Ingalls, the E. W. Scripps Company approached Associated Press. Since Scripps
was already receiving services equivalent to the Kentucky Regional trunk from United
Press International, it was interested only in Associated Press' "A," "D," and Ohio
Big Cities Circuit trunks. Associated Press quoted a charge for those three trunks.
49. Id. at 765. For example, the sports wire, which was once part of the basic serv-
ice, was separated and a specific charge made for those who continued to subscribe.
Ibid.
50. Id. at 764.
51. Id. at 765. "Once the other elements of an unlawful tie-in have been established,
appellant's defense should not be nullified by the manner in which AP keeps its books
or the unavailability of cost records upon which a precise computation of separate
costs could be made." Ibid.
52. See note 21 supra.
53. With respect to its dispatches, Associated Press, though it does not maintain
a copyright, has been held to have a quasi-property right which may serve as a basis
for an action against those making unauthorized use of them. International News
Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). Of course, the potential value of
this quasi-property right may have been considerably lessened by the decision in As-
sociated Press v. United States, supra note 11.
54. 340 F.2d at 767.
55. While only a minor point, it is significant to note that Taft-Ingalls experienced
an operational deficit for only one year prior to its decision to sell out. "Recurring"
was an overstatement of the facts. Even if Taft-Ingalls had chosen to experience a
"recurring operational deficit," that fact does not necessarily indicate that the Ohio
Big Cities Circuit was desirable; it was contractually bound to take the entire package
for at least two years after the arrangement had become unfavorable to it.
56. Ibid. The court also quoted Associated Press v. United States, supra note 11,
at 13: "Inability to buy news from the largest news agency, or any one of its multitude
of members, can have most serious effects on the publication of competitive news-
papers, both those presently published and those which, but for these restrictions,
might be published in the future."
57. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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NLRB58 it had already been held that the exchange of news between
Associated Press members constituted interstate commerce. The find-
ings that Associated Press, since 1935, had continually required mem-
bers in principal metropolitan trunk points to subscribe to the single
package, and that ninety-four per cent of the total circulation of all
newspapers at those forty-three trunk points was traceable to Asso-
ciated Press members, conclusively established that the amount of
interstate commerce involved was substantial.
Two aspects of this case deserve particular comment. The first
is the court's treatment of the problem of product differentiation.
Putting to one side the dubious nature of the authority relied upon in
dealing with this point,5 9 the court's approach indicates a state of
confusion. A reasonable person viewing the various trunk services
of Associated Press,60 their specialization in a particular category of
news,61 and their separate physical apparatus,62 would have no doubt
that each trunk was a separate product.63 The various factors cited by
the court to support its conclusion that these trunks were separable
were all circumstantial support for the finding that the costs were
divisible.64 However, the court should have gone further than to
say that Taft-Ingalls did not have the burden of establishing a clear
division of costs, 5 for that issue is irrelevant to the question of product
differentiation. The crucial test on this point is whether the consumer
differentiated the tied product from the tying product. If potential
competition is to be maintained at a maximum level, the market for
any product which a consumer might desire should be scrutinized.
This approach does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that a
consumer may require that a producer sell him a product delineated
according to his every whim, for the consumer's demand will prevail
only if the producer's delineation results in an unreasonable restraint
on trade.66 This approach merely recognizes that the evils of the tie-in
58. Supra note 11.
59. Supra note 46. In addition to the inappropriateness of the court's use of United
States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp. noted above, we see note 34 supra, it should be noted
that the affirmance in that case was limited to the ultimate conclusion that the tying
arrangement was unlawful on the basis of the holding in Northern Pacific Ry. v. United
States, supra note 17. See 365 U.S. at 567.
60. See note 5 supra.
61. Ibid.
62. See note 1 supra.
63. While less obvious than justifying the tie-in of, for example, "Gone With the
Wind" to "Getting Gertie's Garter" as the sale of the product feature films, the
justification in this case has little more merit. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., supra
note 35 at 48 n.6.
64. See notes 48 through 50 supra and accompanying text.
65. Supra note 51.
66. For example, it does not mean that a consumer could require Westinghouse to
sell its radios without a speaker. However, that is so, not because a speaker-less radio
is not a distinct product from the speaker-high fidelity equipment is often sold in
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may exist wherever a consumer's product delineation differs from that
of the producer. Divisibility of costs and other like factors are relevant
not to the existence of a distinct product, but to the ultimate issue
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act-the reasonableness of the
restraint resulting from the sale of two distinct products as one.
Confusing issues, like that of product differentiation, arise, no doubt,
from the existence of the per se rule of illegality. As traditionally
applied, the per se rule forecloses any consideration of possible justi-
fications for the practice in question. If the per se rule is applied to
tying arrangements in the traditional manner, a court may feel con-
strained by the harshness of its application to a particular set of facts
to avoid that application by technical or artifical distinctions. Yet, the
cases seem to indicate that, as applied to tying arrangements, the per
se rule will not necessarily foreclose a consideration of all possible
justifications.67 Certainly this is as it should be. Courts should not
feel constrained to follow blindly their own judicial short-cuts when
it clearly appears that in so doing they will not reach the intended
destination-a reasonable decision.
A second aspect of this case, equally significant, is the court's treat-
ment of the "uniqueness and desirability" test for finding "sufficient
economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition
in the tied product."68 The court was clearly correct in holding that
sufficient economic power may be inferred from the uniqueness of the
tying product or its desirability to the consumer.69 A finding, however,
that the tying product is unique or desirable as those words are
generally used is not enough. The tying product must be unique
enough or desirable enough that sufficient economic power may be
reasonably inferred. The "uniqueness and desirability" test originated
with the cases dealing with block-booking in the motion picture
industry.70 It is obvious that a film distributor who offered "Gone
With the Wind," for example, on the condition that the exhibitor also
accept several fourth-rate films, might be able to impose an appreci-
able restraint on the market for fourth-rate films. Yet, to say that
Associated Press news dispatches offer a similar amount of leverage
is not nearly so reasonable. Certainly, the fact, upon which the court
in the instant case relied heavily,71 that the dispatches may not be
used without Associated Press's authorization is irrelevant. The
determinative question is whether they are desirable to the consumer,
that form-but rather because to require the purchase of the complete unit does not
place an unreasonable restraint on competition for the sale of radio speakers.
67. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
68. See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text.
69. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
70. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
71. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
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in this case the publisher. The court's reliance upon Associated Press
v. United States72 as authority for the proposition that Associated
Press's news dispatches have sufficient consumer appeal to serve as a
basis for an inference of sufficient economic power is equally naive.
Not only have twenty years passed since that decision, but the
competitive structure of the news agency market may have been sub-
stantially changed by the merger of United Press and International
News Service into United Press International in 1957. 3 It may be
that an analysis of the present market would still find Associated
Press so dominant that its dispatches do provide the requisite leverage.
The point is that no such analysis was made. Taft-Ingalls' willingness
to suffer an operational deficit by continuing its subscription to
Associated Press's basic package rather than give up the Ohio Big
Cities Circuit might serve as a basis for a reasonable inference that
Associated Press had sufficient economic power with respect to the
Ohio Big Cities Circuit. 4 Yet, even assuming that to be true, two
problems remain. It would be extremely difficult to find that a "not
insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce would be restrained
thereby.75 Moreover, where the issue of illegality is raised as a defense
to an action on the contract, a finding of illegality based solely on
the defendant's continued operation at a deficit under the contract
seems inconsistent with the well established principle that financial
setback is no defense to an action for breach of contract.76 While
sufficient economic power might be inferred from the very existence
of the large number of these package contracts were there no other
explanation for their existence,7 7 there is such an explanation here.
The members of Associated Press surely realized that by agreeing to
take a minimum package and thereby share a minimum amount of
the costs each member would benefit. This is the very idea behind
a cooperative venture such as Associated Press. Indeed, this relation-
ship between Associated Press and Taft-Ingalls may well be the
factor which makes the tie-in argument so inappropriate. While Taft-
Ingalls might be viewed as an independent purchaser of news from
Associated Press, this view of the facts ignores the nature of the
cooperative undertaking. The members of Associated Press merely
combined their resources for the more efficient and economical per-
formance of one of the integral functions of newspaper publication, the
gathering and dissemination of news. Associated Press, as a legal
72. Supra note 10.
73. Supra note 2.
74. But see note 57 supra.
75. Certainly, it would be a great deal more difficult than it was in this case where
sufficient economic power was found to exist in all of the Associated Press dispatches.
76. 6 CoanN, CoNT:aCrs § 1333 (1962).
77. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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entity, stood to gain nothing from the package assessment of certain
of its members; it was not operated for profit. If there was any
leverage or coercion exerted upon Taft-Ingalls, it was not the economic
coercion of an independent seller, but the coercion of a majority on a
minority-a type of coercion inherent in any cooperative enterprise.
Perhaps the appropriate method of controlling this sort of coercion,
if the cooperative enterprise should become so significant a segment
of the national economy that such control is desirable, would be the
application of the "public utility" concept to Associated Press.7 8
While recognizing that big business is often in the public interest,79 the
public utility approach also recognizes that as an enterprise ap-
proaches monopolistic proportions, 0 the potential effect of its decisions
on the national economy may be undesirable if those decisions are
entirely unrestrained. Rather than requiring that the enterprise be
decentralized-a requirement which, itself, could be detrimental to
the national economy-the court merely acts as a check on the
decisional processes of the enterprise. Thus, if a given decision is
thought to be inimical to the national interest, the court may step in
and modify that decision."'
78. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
79. This is particularly true in the instant case. The very reason for the formation
of Associated Press was the financial inability of individual newspapers to establish
world-wide news gathering apparatus. In addition to providing the public with a
service which might not have been possible were it not for that cooperative under-
taking, Associated Press has saved the public those expensive and wasteful duplica-
tions of effort inevitable if individual attempts had been made.
80. The leading case dealing with the public utility approach, United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), involved a monopoly situation. At least
one member of the United States Supreme Court would limit the application of that
approach to enterprises actually occupying a monopolistic position. See note 15 supra.
Yet, its application to large oligopolistic enterprises seems equally appropriate.
81. This approach, at least, would not hamstring appropriate policy considerations
with inappropriate legal concepts like tying arrangements. Once the tying arrangement
Format is abandoned, the competing policy considerations present in the instant case
become obvious. On the one hand is the public utility of the package service plan
of Associated Press. That plan enables the association to provide a more compre-
hensive service for members in principal metropolitan areas than would be possible
otherwise. On the other hand is the public detriment resulting from the restraint on
competition which this package service plan may exert. However, two factors render
this latter consideration less significant than the former. First, Taft-Ingalls was able to
illustrate only one instance where an actual restraint on competition resulted. That in-
stance involved competition for one small component of the more comprehensive service
involved. Second, there is some doubt in this writer's mind that any significant re-
straint exists beyond that shown by Taft-Ingalls. If a majority of the member metro-
politan publishers felt restrained by this arrangement, it seems strange that it has
not been abandoned. They voted it into existence and they could vote it out of
existence. Where the public detriment is as minor or speculative as that in the
instant case, a policy in favor of comprehensive and efficient dissemination of news
should result in a decision which would permit Associated Press to continue its pack-
age service agreement with member metropolitan newspapers.
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Antitrust-Union-Employer Agreements as to Labor
Demands To Be Sought From Other Employers
United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund,
as petitioner, brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee against the respondents, small coal
mine operators, for failure to make royalty payments alleged to be
due and payable under a national wage agreement executed by UMW
and the respondents. The coal companies filed an answer and a
crossclaim against UMW, alleging that UMW and certain large coal
mine operators had conspired to restrain and monopolize interstate
commerce in violation of the antitrust laws. Respondent's crossclaim
alleged that UMW agreed with the large coal companies to impose
the terms of the wage agreement on all coal operators, regardless
of their ability to pay. Respondents further alleged that the agree-
ment sought to solve the critical overproduction problem in the coal
industry by eliminating the smaller companies, thereby leaving the
larger operators in control of the market.J UMW urged exemption
from any antitrust liability because it had legitimately acted as a labor
union in executing the complained-of agreement. The trial court
denied UMW's motion to dismiss, holding that the facts alleged, if
true, would warrant recovery. A verdict for the respondents was
entered, and both UMW's motions for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial were denied. The
Court of Appeals affirmed,2 ruling that on the facts of the case UMW
was not exempt from liability under the Sherman Act. On writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed.
UMW's activities were not exempt from the antitrust laws, and the
trial court did not err in refusing the union's motions. The Court's
reversal was based on the trial court's erroneous instruction that union
efforts to influence public officials, if intended to eliminate competi-
tion, constituted a conspiracy covered by the antitrust laws.3 Such
conduct, though intended to eliminate competition and though part
of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act, is absolutely
1. Respondents' specific allegations of union activities aimed at this elimination
were in substance: The union (a) abandoned efforts to control the working time of the
miners; (b) agreed not to oppose mechanization of the mine; (c) agreed to help
finance such mechanization; (d) agreed to impose the terms of the 1950 agreement on
all operators without regard to their ability to pay; (e) agreed with large coal
operators upon other steps to exclude the marketing, production, and sale of non-union
coal, one of which was the union joining with coal companies to approach the Secretary
of Labor to obtain establishment under the Walsh-Healey Act, 49 Stat. 2037, 41 U.S.C.
§§ 35-45 (1958), of a minimum wage for employers of contractors selling coal to the
TVA.
2. Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963).
3. See note 1(e) supra.
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exempt from the Sherman Act, and the jury should have been so
instructed. UMW v. Pennington, 85 Sup. Ct. 1585 (1965).
Similar allegations of union conduct resulting in antitrust violations
were presented before the Supreme Court in a companion case to
Pennington. Here the petitioners, meat cutters' unions representing
virtually all the butchers in the Chicago area, and an association of
Chicago grocers agreed to forbid the sale of fresh meat before 9 A.M.
and after 6 P.M., Monday through Saturday. In its own negotiations
with the unions, the respondent, Jewel Tea Company, a large chain of
retail stores, proposed the evening sale of prepackaged meat only.
4
The unions rejected this plan, and Jewel Tea, under duress of a strike,
also agreed to the marketing hours restriction. It later brought suit
against both the unions and the association, alleging violations of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The trial court dismissed the
complaints upon finding that the unions had bargained for the market-
ing hours restriction to serve their own interests rather than those
of the association, for the evening sale of meat would necessarily
place a heavier burden on the butchers. Thus, the court concluded
that no conspiracy to impose the marketing hours restriction on Jewel
Tea could be found. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed,5 without disturbing the trial court's decision,
concluding that the agreement itself was evidence of a conspiracy in
restraint of trade. "The unions and the association entered into a
combination or agreement, which constituted a conspiracy, as charged
in the complaint. Whether it be called an agreement, contract, or con-
spiracy is immaterial."6 On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of
the United States, held, reversed. An agreement between the union
and the employers in a bargaining unit on the opening and closing
hours of the employers' shops was not illegal under the Sherman Act;
the union's imposition of the same contract terms on other employers
in the industry was likewise not illegal. Meat Cutters Union v. Jewel
Tea Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 1596 (1965).7
The Sherman Act8 "was enacted in the era of 'trusts' and 'combi-
nations' of business and of capital organized and directed to control
of the market by suppression of competition on the marketing
4. In 174 of the Jewel Tea stores, the respondent had installed a pre-packaged, self-
service system where the meat was cut and wrapped prior to sales. This arrangement
was to eliminate the need of butchering services for customers as the respondent
provided for the storage of the meats in large, self-service refrigeration equipment.
5. 331 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1964).
6. Id. at 551.
7. Mr. Justice White announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion,
in wheh the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan joined; the remaining votes
necessary to make a majority came with the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg,
with whom Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart joined.
8. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
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of goods and business, the monopolistic tendency of which had be-
come a matter of public concern."9 Desiring to correct this evil and
thereby foster competition, Congress enacted the Sherman Act. The
problem soon arose as to whether labor activities were to be included
under Sherman Act coverage.10 In the early days of the labor move-
ment, union strikes were employed to organize the workers of an
entire industry into union membership. Secondary consumer boy-
cotts, directed at eliminating sales of non-union-made goods, naturally
resulted in a direct restraining effect on interstate commerce." In
1908, the Supreme Court in Loewe v. Lawler,12 held that the use of
a secondary boycott designed to compel an employer to unionize his
shop was a combination in restraint of commerce within the purview
of the Sherman Act. In 1914, in response to the judiciary's attempt to
formulate a national labor policy, Congress amended and supple-
mented the Sherman Act with the Clayton Act.13 Section 6 of the
latter enunciates a national policy exempting labor unions from the
Sherman Act:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor . . . organizations . . . or to forbid ...
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof... 14
The Supreme Court first applied the Clayton Act in Duplex Printing
Press v. Deering.15 In this case, as in Lawler, the union had employed
a secondary boycott which interfered with the purchase and installa-
tion of the complainant's printing presses in other states. The Court
refused to give a broad interpretation of the Clayton Act, interpreting
the language of section 6 to grant no immunity from antitrust liability
"where [unions] depart from normal and legitimate objects .... 16
Thus, under Duplex, work stoppages executed by a combination of
employees were deemed illegal under the antitrust laws where the
9. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503-04 (1940). For the economic,
social, constitutional, and political background of the passage of the Sherman Act,
see generally THORELLI, THE FmnP.AL ANT[TUST POLICY-ORGANZATION" OF AN
A, ammucAN TRAADmoN (1955).
10. Daykin, The Status of Unions Under Our Antitrust Laws, 11 LABOR L.J. 216
(1960).
11. Crabtree, The Antitrust Exemption of Labor Unions Considered In Conjunc-
tion With Unfair Labor Practices Which Restrain Interstate Commerce, 2 TuLSA LJ.
32 (1965).
12. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
13. See 21 CoNG. BEe. 2457, 2611 (1890); FRANxFURTER & GREEN, THm LABOR
INjuNmoN 139 n.17 (1930), as to why this amendment was needed.
14. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
15. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
16. Id. at 469.
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purpose of such stoppage was to restrain interstate commerce.'7 The
Norris-LaGuardia Act 8 was passed by Congress in 1932 as a result
of the Supreme Court's decision in Duplex and the line of cases which
followed.' 9 While framed in terms of restrictions on the use of in-
junctions, the statute has subsequently been viewed as representing
an "underlying aim to restore the broad purpose which Congress
thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act but which was frus-
trated, '" 20 [that purpose being to grant labor unions freedom from
antitrust liability.] Another purpose attributed to the Norris-La-
Guardia Act was the congressional desire to limit the judiciary's role in
any labor-antitrust controversy.2' Subsequent labor statutes have
further narrowed judicial discretion in interpreting the antitrust effects
of labor policy. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act)
entrusted principal control of labor policy to the National Labor
Relations Board. 22 The act also defined certain activities applicable
to employers, as "unfair labor practices," and provided that unions
must bargain over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." 23 The Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley
Act) amended the Wagner Act by making certain employer "unfair
labor practices" applicable to unions and by defining a series of
"unfair labor practices" applicable to unions specifically.24 The Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin
Act)25 also amended the Wagner Act by describing labor practices
deemed to be detrimental to the public good. The full impact of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act could be seen in the Supreme Court's
decision in Apex Hosiery v. Leader26 and United States v. Hutcheson.
2 7
In Apex, a union had seized a hosiery factory through the use of an
extended "sit-down" strike. The union's conduct prevented the com-
pletion of a large number of orders from interstate customers. After
an extensive examination of the Sherman Act, the Court stated:
17. See, e.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S.
37 (1927)- Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1924); Alco-Zander Co. v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 35 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Pa. 1929).
18. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
19. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1941); Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 102-03 (1940);
Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 73-74 (1961).
20. United States v. Hutcheson, supra note 19.
21. Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 370 n.7 (1960).
22. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
23. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1964).
24. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
25. 73"Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964).
26. Supra note 9.
27. Supra note 19.
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Strikes or agreements not to work, entered into by laborers to compel em-
ployers to yield to their demands, may restrict to some extent the power of
employers who are parties to the dispute to compete in the market with
those not subject to such demands. But under the doctrine applied to non-
labor cases, the mere fact of such restrictions on competition does not in
itself bring the parties to the agreement within the condemnation of the
Sherman Act.28
The test applied by the Court in Apex required union activity to be
aimed at the control of the product market, with intent to restrict
competition, before a violation of the Sherman Act resulted.29 In
Hutcheson, the Supreme Court was faced with a boycott similar to
the Duplex situation. There the Court reasoned that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was more than a bar to the use of injunctions in labor
disputes. The rule derived from Hutcheson stated: "So long as a
union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor
groups, the licit and illicit . . . are not to be distinguished by any
judgment... of the wisdom or unwisdom... of the ends of which
the particular union activities are the means."30 Hutcheson, in reality,
exempted organized labor from the antitrust laws, except under rare
circumstances, an example of which is found in the factual situation
involved in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW.31 There the union
was successful in obtaining agreements whereby all electrical con-
tractors were to purchase electrical equipment exclusively from
local manufacturers employing union workers. The manufacturers
in turn agreed to sell only to contractors who employed union
members. The Court felt that such arrangements resulted in
"industry-wide understandings, looking not merely to terms and
conditions of employment [legitimate labor objectives], but also to
price and market control [illegitimate labor objectives]." 2 The Court
concluded that "when the unions participated with a combination of
business men . . . to prevent all competition from others, a situation
was created not included within the exemptions of the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts."m Thus, prior to the Court's decisions in
Pennington and Jewel Tea, labor's exemption from the antitrust laws
depended upon whether the union, had moved outside its legitimate
field of activities, even though solely for its self-interest, by combining
with a business group to restrain commerce.
In later cases, including Pennington and Jewel Tea, the courts
28. 310'U.S. at 503.
29. Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 29 (1964).
30. 312 U.S. at 232.
31. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
32, Id. at 799-800.
33. Id. at 809.
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were faced with the difficult proposition of ascertaining whether
labor agreements conferred a direct benefit upon the union members
and only incidentally benefitted employers, or whether the agree-
ment merely employed union participation as a shield to conceal
illegal schemes by employers.-' The majority opinion of the Court
in Pennington was delivered by Mr. Justice White. He stated that
even agreements concerned with mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining generally not subject to the antitrust laws, are not auto-
matically exempt from the Sherman Act. The exemption does not
apply to such agreements if they are indicative of a combination
or conspiracy with employers, even though the mechanism for
effectuating the purpose of the combination may be an agreement
regarding terms or conditions of employment. When a union bar-
gains with the wilful intention of destroying competition, then
the bargaining exceeds the permissible scope of labor activities
exempted from antitrust liability.3 5 Relying on labor policy as ex-
pressed in the National Labor Relations Act, Mr. Justice White stated
that the limits of the labor exemption are dependent upon the
unions' duty to bargain. Any agreement made pursuant to duty-to-
bargain negotiations (mandatory subjects of bargaining) is exempt
from the Sherman Act. He stressed, however, that the duty-to-bargain
is a "duty to bargain unit by unit." A union agreement with certain
employers in a bargaining unit as to what wages that union will seek
with other employers in that unit is outside the scope of the union's
duty to bargain and is not covered by the labor exemption."6 In
Jewel Tea, in which he also wrote the opinion of the Court,37 Mr.
Justice White again stated that the labor exemption protects only
agreements dealing with mandatory subjects of bargaining. Applying
this rationale to this different fact situation, however, he found the
question of hours during which employees must work to be so closely
linked to "wages, hours, and working conditions" as to be within that
mandatory classification. Relying upon the trial court's finding that
evening sales of meat could not be made without an increased burden
on the union butchers, he concluded that the marketing hours restric-
tion was a legitimate concern of the union. In Pennington, Mr. Justice
34. Wesson, The Legal Effect of Antitrust Laws on Collective Bargaining 14, April
1965 (unpublished dissertation in the Vanderbilt Law School Library).
35. "A union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown
that it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other
bargaining units. One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors
. . . and the union is liable with the employers if it becomes a party. . . . This is true
even though the union's part . . . is an undertaking to secure the same wages, hours
or conditions of employment from the remaining employers in the industry." UMW v.
Pennington, 85 Sup. Ct. 1585, 1591 (1965).
36. 1 BNA 1965 LAB. REL. REP. 59: 240.
37. See note 7 supra.
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White had stated that a union, as long as it acted "as a matter of
its own policy, and not by agreement with all or part of the em-
ployers of that unit" 8 could legally seek to impose a uniform wage
rate on all employers within a bargaining unit. In line with this view,
he concluded that in Jewel Tea the union had sought its market hours
restriction, not as a result of a bargain with employers, but inde-
pendently in pursuit of what it deemed to be in the best interests of
the union.39 However, had the union agreement not been so inti-
mately related to a mandatory subject of bargaining, it might well
have been in violation of the Sherman Act.
In his concurring opinion in Pennington, Mr. Justice Douglas read
the majority opinion as setting forth the rule that an industry-wide
agreement which exceeds the ability of some employers to conform
thereto is prima facie evidence of a violation of the antitrust laws.
Applying this rule in his dissent to Jewel Tea, Mr. Justice Douglas
contended that the collective bargaining agreement concerning the
market hours restriction was itself sufficient evidence of a conspiracy.
To Mr. Justice Douglas, the agreements in both cases had such a
direct effect on competition and such an obvious restraint upon the
product market that they should establish a prima facie violation. 0
The Court should not allow big business and big labor acting in
concert to exercise a power which can result in the control and mold-
ing of whole sectors of the national economy. Mr. Justice Douglas
rejects the trial court's findings that Jewel Tea could not operate
its self-service stores without burdening the working hours of the
union butchers.
In his separate union, Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Mr. Justice
Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart, dissented from the majority opinion
in Pennington but concured in its reversal and concurred in the
judgment of the Court in Jewel Tea. Extensively reviewing the history
of judicial interpretation of labor's exemption from the antitrust laws,
he contended that Congress clearly intended to foreclose judges and
juries from making essentially economic judgments in antitrust actions
by determining whether unions or employers had proper motives
for their agreements with respect to subjects of a mandatory bargain-
ing. It is precisely in this area of wages, hours, and other working
conditions that Congress has recognized that unions "have a sub-
stantial, direct, and basic interest of their own to advance."41 Mr.
Justice Goldberg concluded that this direct and overriding union
interest should make any union agreement on a mandatory subject
38. UMW v. Pennington, supra note 35, at 1590.
39. Meat Cutters Union v. Jewel Tea Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 1601 (1965).
40. 85 Sup. Ct. at 1595.
41. 85 Sup. Ct. at 1607, 1620.
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of collective bargaining immune from antitrust liability, regardless
of the economic results involved. To implement the congressional
intent, Mr. Justice Goldberg felt the only restrictions on free collective
bargaining should be those expressly outlined in the Wagner Act,
as amended.42 By his reasoning, the application of the majority rule
in Pennington would be an unworkable restraint upon collective
bargaining and an interference with the clear national labor policy
objective of promoting the establishment of wages, hours, and other
terms or conditions of employment through free collective bargaining.
Mr. Justice Goldberg stressed the damaging consequences to labor
as a result of the majority rationale: union liability is laid open to
the particular prejudices and economic philosophies of the judges
and juries in future cases.
The central problem posed by the labor exemption is how to
remove the restraints on competition created by a combination of
union and employer power without undermining perpetuation and
promotion of collective bargaining. Both are familiar and generally
accepted national policies. It is, however, inevitable that as collective
bargaining will generally result in an agreement, it should have anti-
competitive reverberations. Each court confronted with an alleged
union violation of the antitrust laws is therefore faced with a complex
policy interplay. The court must consider what types of restraints
on competition society seeks to prevent or wishes to allow. Moreover,
before a court can make this decision it must also decide if the
judiciary is the proper instrument to implement the national labor
policy, or whether this interpretation and formulation should be left
to the National Labor Relations Board. Mr. Justice Goldberg would
argue that Congress has made this selection by leaving these policy
decisions to the NLRB rather than to the judiciary. In Pennington,
Mr. Justice White discussed the issue of whether the NLRB should
have primary jurisdiction over the case, and decided it should not,
since the Court had the necessary knowledge to deal adequately
with the controversies in point. The NLRB should be granted pri-
mary jurisdiction when the courts are significantly less competent to
determine issues involved. Mr. Justice Goldberg's reasoning on this
issue would severely restrict the judiciary's role in dealing with cases
involving mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Under pro-
cedures of administrative law, a court in reviewing an administrative
ruling should reverse only when an error clearly appears.43 Such a
severe restriction on grounds for reversal would reduce the judiciary's
role substantially. While such a narrowed judicial role would no
42. Id. at 1615.
43. See 2 AM. Jur. 2d Administrative Law §§ 553-775 (1962). See especially id. §
661 on the "clearly erroneous" rule of judicial review.
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doubt be favorable to the promotion of collective bargaining, its
advisability seems highly doubtful when viewed in light of the
purposes and goals of the antitrust laws.
The solution of the trust problem represented by the Sherman Act was an
elegant one.... Rather than attempting the grueling task of defining once
and for all the multitude of forms in which the evil might appear Congress
resorted to a few concise phrases of exceedingly broad significance. In
applying this act the federal courts could be counted on to make use of
that certain technique of judicial reasoning characteristic of common law
courts. Aware that the modes of restraint will vary considerably from one
industry and period to another, Congress thus deliberately provided for a
certain degree of flexibility in the law.44
Once over the jurisdictional hurdle, the court must reach a policy
decision as to whether the labor restraint on competition is accept-
able. The majority opinion in Pennington, as expressed by Mr. Justice
White, viewed with alarm the powerful anti-competitive potential
inherent in concerted action by big business and big labor. The
social good calls for the outlawing of such a preponderance of eco-
nomic strength and control, and the antitrust laws have been designed
expressly to accomplish this end. Mr. Justice Goldberg presented the
opposing policy argument that when a labor organization makes a
bona-fide, long-range effort to remedy the ills affecting its members
with respect to their terms or conditions of employment, society should
tolerate the resulting restraints on competition. The economic effect
of UMW's agreement was detrimental to the interest of the small
coal operator in the coal industry; the economic effect of agreement
in Jewel Tea was to protect the smaller meat stores in the Chicago
area. Thus, the Court's decisions in both cases have resulted in a
preservation of the small economic unit in the respective industry.
This fact may reflect a judicial preference for the policy of the anti-
trust laws.45
The most obvious result of these cases is to establish that union-
employer agreement concerning what terms will be sought from other
employers in the bargaining unit constitutes a per se violation of
the Sherman Act. This inevitably places a restraint on the process
of collective bargaining. The fact that under antitrust law an illegal
agreement between labor and management can be inferred from sur-
rounding facts leaves bargaining participants in doubt as to just what
44. THoRELLt, op. cit. supra note 9, at 571.
45. Yet, in the coal industry it can be strongly argued that little social or economic
good results from the preservation of destructive competition by the small producers
at the industry's edge. See BAnE, INDsTuAr. ORGANIZATION 579-82 (1959), for a
brief history of the pattern of destructive competition in the coal industry, along




facts will be sufficient to establish a "conspiracy." As stressed in
Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissenting opinion, the majority decision seems
to be unduly restrictive in that it ignores the realities involved in
every labor-employer negotiation. As long as employers face the
insecurity associated with competition, the temptation to refrain
from collective bargaining agreements will be strong. The employer
becomes a willing collective bargaining participant only when his
position in the market is insured by union-imposed restraints on
competition.46 The rule fails to take into account that it is vital to
every bargain that notice be taken of the condition of the industry
involved in terms of economic realities. Yet, under Pennington it is
unclear at just what point liability will result under the antitrust laws
when union and employer include in their negotiations a discus-
sion of their industry in terms of their individual agreement. An
ironical result of the Court's decisions in these two cases falls upon
the employers themselves. Equal liability is imposed upon them by
the Court, and in reality they are even more susceptible to antitrust
liability than the union since the latter can legitimately act inde-
pendently in areas forbidden to the employer. A possible future appli-
cation of Pennington would be in a union-brought antitrust suit against
employers who have acted together to lockout unions when a union
strikes against one employer.47 The separate opinions of justices
White, Douglas and Goldberg range across the whole scale of policy
in regard to labor's exemption from the Sherman Act. Mr. Justice
White focuses on two issues emphasizing the form of the union
action and its effect on competition. He would ask: "Is the union
acting individualy for its best interests or has it joined with business to
accomplish an unlawful consequence." Mr. Justice Douglas focuses
on the second of these points, the economic results brought about by
the collective bargaining agreement. He would ask: "Does the agree-
ment result in a direct restraint on competition? If so, it is prima
facie evidence of a conspiracy in restraint of trade. Mr. Justice Gold-
berg, on the other hand, would have the courts look to the subject
involved in the union agreement. He would ask: "Is this a mandatory
subject of bargaining?" If so, then he would hold the agreement
immune from antitrust liability. In light of this wide range of opinion
and philosophy advanced by the members of the Court, it seems likely
that rather than using Pennington or Jewel Tea as precise guidelines
to union antitrust liability, subsequent court decisions must continue
to grapple with the dual social values recognized by the majority,
hoping to allow each its optimum realization when the two are in
conflict.
46. Winter, supra note 29, at 21. The arguments here presented on the unrealistic
quality of the Allen Bradley decision are equally applicable to the present case.
47. Supra note 36, at 244.
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Constitutional Law-Laws Prohibiting the Use of
Contraceptives by Married Couples for the
Prevention of Conception Are Unconstitutional
Two directors of the Planned Parenthood League' were convicted
of being accessories to the violation of a Connecticut statute pro-
hibiting the use of contraceptives for the purpose of preventing con-
ception.2 Defendant Buxton had examined married women and pre-
scribed contraceptive devices to be used for the purpose proscribed
by the statute. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors upheld
the convictions.3 Defendants appealed to the United States Supreme
Court claiming the statute under which they were convicted violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In a seven-to-
two decision involving three concurring opinions the Supreme Court
held, reversed.4 Marital privacy is a fundamental right protected
from state infringement by the fourteenth amendment, and the
Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married
couples is an infringement on that right.5 Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
The present case is the third in a series of attempts to have the
Connecticut contraceptive statute declared unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court. In Tileston v. Ullman,6 the first attempt,
1. Griswold was Executive Director of the League. Dr. Buxton was Medical Di-
rector for one of the League's clinics. A licensed physician and professor at Yale
Medical School, he was challenging the statute for the second time. His first ap-
pearance was in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
2. CONN. GE_. STAT. IRv. § 53-32 (1958) reads: "Any person who uses any drug,
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined
not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year
or be both fined and imprisoned."
CONN. GEN. ST.AT. REv. § 54-196 (1958) reads: "Any person who assists, abets,
counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prose-
cuted and punished as if he were the principal offender."
3. Griswold v. State, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479 (1964).
4. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. Connecticut's contraceptive law, in the opinion of one writer, is the strictest in
the nation. Comment, 49 ConNELL L.Q. 275 (1964). There are, however, 29 state
statutes and one federal statute which regulate some phase of the manufacture, sale
or distribution of contraceptives. The original federal law was the Comstock Act
passed by Congress in 1873. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-62 (1964). Physicians were ex-
cepted from the first bill, but the exception was removed by amendment. CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1436 (1873). Later court interpretation read the ex-
ception back into the act. United States v. One Package, 13 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936).
6. 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582 (1942), appeal dismissed, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
Tileston involved the effort of a doctor to get a declaratory judgment as to whether
the Connecticut statute precluded doctors from prescribing contraceptives in cases
where conception endangered the patient's life. A further declaration as to the
statute's constitutionality was sought if the court should find the statute applicable
to doctors. Three years earlier the Connecticut court had specifically refused to rule on
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the Court dismissed the doctor's appeal stating, "patients are not
parties to this proceeding and there is no basis on which we can
say that he has standing to secure an adjudication of his patients'
constitutional right to life." 7 The Court also noted that the petitioner
had raised no question of deprivation of "liberty or property in con-
travention of the Fourteenth Amendment."8 The second occasion
on which the Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the
Connecticut law was in Poe v. UlimanY To avoid the procedural
difficulties of Tileston, the patient and the doctor both filed com-
plaints in a declaratory judgment proceeding challenging the statute.
The petitioner's efforts were again frustrated when the Supreme
Court refused, in a five-to-four decision, to rule on the merits. 10
It was the opinion of the majority of the Court that violators would
not be prosecuted and that therefore no true controversy was pre-
sented"
In the principal case, Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion
of the Court. He distinguished Tileston on the theory that the peti-
tioner in Tileston sought a declaration of the patient's right to due
process. Petitioner in the present case was an accessory and should
"have standing to assert that the offense which he is charged with
assisting is not, or cannot constitutionally be a crime."' 2 In discussing
the merits of the case, Mr. Justice Douglas did not find that the
Connecticut statute violated any specific language of the Constitution.
He made no mention of the view that the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights are incorporated as a group into the fourteenth amendment
and thereby made applicable to the states. He adopted, instead, the
the statute's applicability if a patient's life was endangered. State v. Nelson, 126
Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940), involved a physician and his associates who pre-
scribed contraceptives for a married woman to protect her general health, and then
demurred to a charge of violating the statute. They claimed it was not applicable to
physicians where the prevention of conception was necessary to preserve health. The
Connecticut Superior Court upheld the demurrer, but the Supreme Court of Errors
reversed and reinstated the trial court's conviction. Connecticut's highest court con-
cluded that the Nelson decision controlled in Tileston and thereby closed the door to
any possible exceptions. The Planned Parenthood League subsequently closed all its
clinics. Tileston v. Ullman, supra at 87, 26 A.2d at 584.
7. 318 U.S. at 44.
8. Ibid. The Court had failed to find a federal question five years earlier in a
similar case involving Massachusetts' contraceptive law. Massachusetts v. Gardner,
300 Mass. 372, 15 N.E.2d 222 (1938), appeal denied, 305 U.S. 559 (1939).
9: See note 1 supra.
10. Mr. Justice Frankfurter writing for the Court said, "Appellants' complaints in
these declaratory judgment proceedings do not clearly, and certainly do not in terms,
allege that the appellee Ullman threatens to prosecute." 367 U.S. at 501.
11. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Harlan wrote extensive dissenting opinions
in which Mr. Justice Stewart concurred. Mr. Justice Black briefly stated his belief
that the Court should deal with the case on its merits. Poe v. Ullman, supra note 1.
12. 381 U.S. at 480.
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theory that the constitution protects certain "peripherar"13 rights
which are not specifically mentioned in the first ten amendments. First
among these is the right of parents to educate their children in the
school of their choice, as established in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.
14
Another is the right of association as established by NAACP v. Ala-
bama.15 He also included the right to read, freedom of inquiry,
freedom of thought, freedom to teach and the right of assembly as
"peripheral rights" which accompany and secure the specific guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights. Meaning and substance is given to the
Bill of Rights by these peripheral rights. 6 The specific constitutional
guarantees create a penumbra, a zone of privacy, which also protects
the right of marital privacy. Mr. Justice Douglas concluded that
states may not invade this right by enacting sweeping legislation in
an effort to regulate other activities.
7
Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Brennan, concurred in a separate opinion. While agreeing that the
right of marital privacy is protected by the shadows of the specific
guarantees, he pointed out that the ninth amendment is a manifesta-
tion of the framers' intention that not all fundamental rights are
included in the Bill of Rights. 18 He denied that his position was
one which incorporated the entire Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment or that the ninth constitutes an independent source of
rights.19 He also denied that fundamental rights are to be determined
by the personal or private notions of judges. For a right to be
"fundamental" it must meet the standards established for the deter-
mination of such rights. The guarantees of the right to many
and raise a family clearly demonstrate the "fundamentar' character
of marital privacy. Connecticut had failed to demonstrate that the
law is "necessary . . . to the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy."20 In conclusion Mr. Justice Goldberg said, "I believe that
the right of privacy in the marital relation is fundamental and basic-
13. Rights which have been recognized by the Court as fundamental but which are
not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights.
14. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
15. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
16. 381 U.S. at 481.
17. Id. at 485.
18. Id. at 488 (concurring opinion). The ninth amendment reads: "The enumera-
tion in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." U.S. CoNsT., amend. IX.
19. "I do not take the position that the entire Bill of Rights is incorporated in the
Fourteenth Amendment, and I do not mean to imply that the Ninth Amendment is
applied against the States by the Fourteenth. Nor do I mean to state that the Ninth
Amendment is applied against the States by the Fourteenth. Nor do I mean to state
that the Ninth Amendment constitutes an independent source of rights protected from
infringement by either the States or the Federal Government." 381 U.S. at 492 (con-
curring opinion).
20. Id. at 498 (concurring opinion).
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a personal right 'retained by the people' within the meaning of the
ninth amendment."2' His conclusion clearly seems to conflict with
his earlier statements concerning the ninth amendment as a source
of fundamental rights.
22
Mr. Justice Harlan, while concurring in the result reached, main-
tained that the Court's opinion reflected another form of the in-
corporation doctrine. The proper inquiry was whether the statute
"violated basic values implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty.' "3
No support from the Bill of Rights is necessary for the due process
clause. It stands on its own foundation and protects certain areas of
liberty without assistance from other provisions of the Constitution.
24
Mr. Justice White in a separate concurring opinion took the posi-
tion that the statute "as applied to married couples deprives them of
'liberty' without due process of law. .... ,25 Such infringement of a
protected liberty places upon the state a heavy burden of justification
which had not been met. The state maintained that the statute
was a part of its policy against promiscuity and illicit sex. Mr.
Justice White pointed out, however, that the use, sale, and importa-
tion of contraceptives is not barred in Connecticut when the purpose
of such activity is to prevent disease. He concluded that under
these circumstances the state's argument that the ban on the use of
contraceptives is an effective and necessary reinforcement of the ban
on illicit sex is difficult to accept.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Stewart wrote separate dissenting
opinions, each joined by the other. Mr. Justice Black took the position
that certain constitutional provisions are designed to protect privacy
under certain circumstances, but that the constitution guarantees no
right of privacy as such. He expressed the fear that to permit the
substitution of other words for a crucial word of a constitutional
guarantee can serve to shrink or expand the protection conferred by
the guarantee. Such substitutions can remove the flexibility from the
provisions. The derivation of the term "right of privacy" from other
provisions of the Bill of Rights illustrates the difficulties involved for
the term "privacy" is most ambiguous.26 Mr. Black felt that no provi-
21. Id. at 499 (concurring opinion).
22. See note 19 supra.
23. 381 U. S. at 500 (concurring opinion).
24. "In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether the Con-
necticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
the enactment violates the basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'
While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own
bottom." Id. at 500 (concurring opinion).
25. Id. at 502 (concurring opinion).
26. Id. at 509 (dissenting opinion).
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sion of the Constitution protected the privacy invaded by the Con-
necticut statute. The Court has no facilities for determining the
"collective conscience of the people" in attempting to decide whether
a right is fundamental. How, then, can the Court avoid giving undue
weight to the personal and private notions of its judges in such a
determination of fundamental rights, unless it restricts itself to the
protection of specific constitutional guarantees. If no specific provision
regulates any one activity, but the people desire such regulation, their
course is to appeal to the legislatureY.
Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, took the position that the over-
turning of state law must be based solely on its violation of the
United States Constitution and not on the Court's evaluation of its
wisdom or effectiveness. According to this proposition there is no
basis in constitutional law for declaring the Connecticut law invalid.28
If the people of Connecticut are not in accord with the statute, they
can apply to the legislature for its repeal.29
It is debatable whether the Court's decision will assist in any
future determination of fundamental rights." Since Mr. Justice White
indicated that his reason for striking down the Connecticut statute
was the failure of the state to justify the infringement upon a pro-
tected right, he might approve other statutes if the burden of
justification was met. The only difference in the Court's opinion and
Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion was the additional emphasis
placed by the latter on the ninth amendment. In this connection, it
should be noted that Mr. Justice Douglas apparently did not wish
to associate the right with any specific amendment. The only con-
clusion one can draw from the case is that at least five of the remain-
ing members of the Court ° recognize marital privacy as a fundamental
right protected from infringement by state and federal governments. 31
However, in passing, one wonders if such a recognition would not
force the Court to strike down any state anti-miscegenation statute
brought before it in the future.
The case is unique in the emphasis which it places on the ninth
27. Id. at 522 (dissenting opinion).
28. "With all deference, I can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of
Rights, in any other part of the constitution, or in any case ever before decided by
this Court." Id. at 530 (dissenting opinion).
29. Id. at 531 (dissenting opinion).
30. Mr. Justice Goldberg resigned to take an appointment as United States Am-
bassador to the United Nations.
31. Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion indicates that while his foundation is
different, his belief is the same. Basically, he is espousing substantive due process
which Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Stewart are claiming has been abandoned
by the Court. The other four members would be the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, Mr. Justice Clark, and Mr. Justice Douglas.
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amendment.32 Should a majority on the Court elect to accept the po-
sition of Mr. Goldberg on the ninth amendment, one can only spec-
ulate on how the Court could influence future state and federal legis-
lation. Substantive due process has been abandoned previously be-
cause the Court could find no provision in the Bill of Rights to sus-
tain it. The ninth amendment could conceivably supply the sus-
taining provision, allowing the Court to return to the method of
determining fundamental rights advocated by Mr. Justice Harlan and
feared by Mr. Justice Black.33 Such a change would again cause the
Court to be squarely faced with the dilemma of attempting to supply
an objective standard to assist in what, of necessity, must be a sub-
jective determination. Since the government is one of delegated
powers, it is suggested that a more objective and profitable approach
would be to ask whether the power to control certain activity was
delegated to the government via the constitution rather than whether
the right was retained by the people. In such a context, the ninth
amendment would seem to have a more logical relevance to consti-
tutional interpretation.
The essence of the decision is that no mandatory government birth
control program would be constitutional under the present circum-
stances. However, two possible developments could altar this situa-
tion. One is a constitutional amendment; the other is that the popu-
lation increase could threaten the health and welfare of the nation to
such an extent as to justify a compulsory law. Mr. justice White
expressly leaves open the latter possibility, and other opinions of the
majority indicate that justification is not impossible.34 One problem,
however, arises in regard to justification. Should conditions become
so pronounced, the utility of such a law would be doubtful; for if
birth control is to provide salvation from the "population explosion,"
it must be effectuated before the population becomes so large as to
pose a threat to the health and welfare.
Many important changes have taken place in the two month period
since this decision. New York and Massachusetts have taken action
which result in a liberalization of their contraceptive laws.35 The
Federal Department of the Interior has initiated a program of advice
and service with regard to birth control, including the dispensation of
contraceptive devices.36 It is estimated by some educators and busi-
nessmen that the Griswold decision will result in an increased private
32. See also United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), the only other
case discussing the ninth amendment.
33. See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
34. 381 U.S. at 485, 503.
35. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1965, p. 1, col. 2.
36. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1965, p. 108.
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and governmental investment in contraceptive research.37 Prior to the
decision, government spending for contraceptive research was limited
because of the political problems such expenditures could engender.
38
Increased research activity holds the promise of developing contracep-
tives which are less expensive, more effective, and less inconvenient.
Such developments could render moot the legal questions surrounding
mandatory government birth control by making voluntary birth control
more acceptable to-and more widely accepted by-the general popula-
tion.
Constitutional Law-Rights of Addressee To
Receive "Communist Political Propaganda"
Protected Under First Amendment
Two cases testing the constitutionality of government detention of
"communist political propaganda" pursuant to section 305(a) of the
Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 19621 were con-
solidated for decision by the United States Supreme Court. Section
305(a) provides for detention of unsealed mail determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury to be "communist political propaganda"' 2 and
37. Business Week, June 19, 1965, p. 108.
38. Ibid. At least one nation has developed a positive policy on birth control.
According to an Indian Consulate, India now operates over 3,700 Family Planning
and Advice Clinics and distributes contraceptives from over 7,200 of its distribution
centers. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1965, p. 1, col. 7.
1. 39 U.S.C. § 4008(a) (1964): "Mail matter, except sealed letters, which
originates or which is printed or otherwise prepared in a foreign country and which
is determined by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to rules and regulations to
be promulgated by him to be 'communist political propaganda' shall be detained by
the Postmaster General upon its arrival for delivery in the United States, or upon its
subsequent deposit in the United States domestic mails, and the addressee shall be
notified that such matter has been received and will be delivered only upon the
addressees request, except that such detention shall not be required in the case of any
matter which is furnished pursuant to subscription or which is otherwise ascertained
by the Postmaster General to be desired by the addressee."
2. Foreign Agents Registration Act, 56 Stat. 249 (1942), 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (1964),
which defines "political propaganda" as "any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictoral
or other communication or expression by any person (1) which is reasonably adapted to
or which the person disseminating the same believes will, or which he intends to,
prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way influence a recipient
or any section of the public within the United States with reference to the political
or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a
political party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States or
promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions, or (2) which
advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political or religious dis-
order, civil riot or other conflict involving the use of force or violence in other
American republic by any means involving the use of force or violence." See generally
Schwartz, The Mail Must Not Go Through-Propaganda and Pornography, 11
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 805 (1963).
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for notification to the addressee of such detention. If the addressee
wishes to receive the detained mail, he must sign and return to the
Post Office a card provided for that purpose in the notification form.
The parties in the instant cases were addresses of certain detained
publications who were duly notified pursuant to the statute. Both
parties then instituted suit to enjoin enforcement of the act on the
ground that it was in violation of the first amendment of the United
States Constitution. The Post Office subsequently notified each of the
parties that it considered their suits to constitute affirmative declara-
tions of a desire to receive "communist political propaganda" and that
the Post Office would not detain such material in the future. One
three judge district court ruled that the Post Office's action rendered
the complaint moot,3 but another three-judge court reached the merits
and held the statute unconstitutional.4 Upon appeal to the Supreme
Court, held, a statute requiring an addressee to request in writing the
delivery of mail determined to be "communist political propaganda"
is an unconstitutional burden upon the exercise of the addressee's first
amendment rights. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301
(1965).
The history of the enforcement of the first amendment freedoms
has centered on protecting the rights of the disseminator of ideas
rather than the rights of the receiver. The right to freedom of speech
has not been regarded as an absolute one. Rather, in each case the
decision whether to enforce this right has been reached by balancing
the public and private interests involved. Using this balancing
process, the court has held invalid: a statute requiring a labor
organizer to obtain an organizer's card before delivering a speech for
the purpose of soliciting union membership;5 a license tax on door-to-
door solicitation and delivery;6 a municipal ordinance requiring a
license for the distribution of literature.7 Previously, the court's most
definite statement concerning the enforceability of the right of a
receiver was dictum in Martin v. City of Struther.8 The Court stated,
"This [first amendment] freedom embraces the right to distribute
literature, and necessarily protects the right to receive it."9
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, expressly held the
statute unconstitutional on the narrow ground that the "addressee in
3. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 229 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See Note,
65 COLum. L. REv. 867 (1965).
4. Heilberg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
5. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
6. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1942).
7. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1937). See also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58 (1963); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Jamison v. Texas, 318
U.S. 412 (1942).
8. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
9. Id. at 143.
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order to receive his mail must request in writing that it be delivered."10
This requirement of an affirmative act as a condition of receipt of the
mail is said to be a burdensome restriction on the "unfettered exercise
of the addressee's First Amendment rights."-" The Court notes that
such a requirement is almost certain to have a deterrent effect,
particularly on persons such as public officials, who have sensitive
positions or whose livelihood may be dependent on a security clear-
ance. The majority, in dealing with the question of the rights of the
receiver, scarcely touches the concept of balancing of interests.'2
However, Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion, treats the
concept more extensively, concluding that the government has proven
no public interest which is of such importance that it outweighs the
fundamental privilege of an individual to receive a publication without
hindrance.
The precise basis of the majority's holding is admittedly narrow;
3
the implication, however, is broad indeed: that the protected first
amendment rights of the hearer or receiver of speech are co-extensive
with the protected rights of the speaker or disseminator, and can be
restricted only if justified by "a compelling state interest in the regula-
tion of the subject."'4 The brief handling accorded the instant case
by the Court, as well as the absence of a dissent, indicate that there
was little doubt that the requirements of the act in question were
unconstitutional abridgements by Congress of the right of freedom
of speech. The majority's final statement that "the regime of this
Act is at war with the uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate and
discussion that are contemplated by the First Amendment"' 5 would
make it appear that the same decision would likely be reached in
other cases in which a receiver of ideas seeks to enforce his right to
receive those ideas without restraint.
10. Lamont v. Postmaster General 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
11. Id. at 1495-96
12. See, e.g., Talley v. California, supra note 7; (dissenting opinion); Bates v. City
of Little RQck, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1957);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). See also Schwartz, supra note 1, for
a detailed discussion of the governmental interests which might be set forth to
balance the interests of the individual.
13. 381 U.S. at 301.
14. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 440, 446 (1963).




Federal Courts-Erie Doctrine Not the Test for
Applicability of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In a diversity action in the Federal District Court of Massachusetts,
plaintiff, an Ohio citizen, sought to recover damages for personal
injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of a now deceased Mas-
sachusetts citizen. Service of process was made on defendant, dece-
dent's executor, by leaving copies of the complaint and summons
with his wife in compliance with rule 4(d) (1) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The defendant moved for summary judgment
contending that the action could not be maintained because a
Massachusetts statute1 required "in hand" service of process2 and
that the adequacy of service should be measured by the state
statute. The district court granted defendant's motion and the
Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.3 On certiorari to the Supreme
Court, held, reversed. Rule 4(d) (1) is valid under both the Rules
Enabling Act4 and the Constitution, and is tfierefore the standard by
which the adequacy of service of process must be measured in
diversity actions despite state law to the contrary. Hanna v. Plumer,
85 Sup. Ct. 136 (1965).
Prior to this decision it was generally assumed that Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins5 determined the applicability of the federal rules in
diversity actions. Erie commanded the federal courts to apply federal
procedural law, but state substantive law. Guaranty Trust Co. V.
York6 redefined the Erie doctrine by establishing an "outcome-
determinative" test that classified legal rules as substantive if their
application would cause the outcome of litigation to be different in
a federal court than in a state court. However, the Court's appli-
cation of the outcome-determinative test in the cases of Ragan v.
1. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 197, § 9 (1958).
2. There are two alternatives to delivery in hand listed in the statute: acceptance
of service by the executor, or filing of a notice of claim in the appropriate registry of
probate. The plaintiff's Ohio counsel did file such a notice, but it was technically
invalid, since it did not state the name of the court in which the claim was pursued.
Brief for Petitioner, p. 3, Hanna v. Plumer, 85 Sup. Ct. 1136 (1965).
3. Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964). The Court of Appeals found
that § 9 of the statute represented a strong state policy of requiring actual notice
to the executor and applied the balancing test of Byrd, infra note 12, concluding that
the state rule outveighed the federal policy of having a uniform procedure in all
federal courts.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe,
by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice
and procedure of the district courts of the United States in civil actions. "Such rules
shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right ......
5. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). This case involved a state statute of limitations which, if
applied, would bar the action. The Court held that the statute of limitations applied
even though it was recognized as procedural for many purposes.
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Merchants .Transfer & Warehouse Co.,7 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus-
trial Loan Corp.,8 and Woods v. Interstate Realty Corp.9 prompted
many writers to conclude that the federal rules were no longer
applicable in diversity actions. 10 In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Co-operative," the Court decided that the outcome-determinative test
was not the sole criterion for deciding whether a legal rule was sub-
stantive or procedural and called for a balancing of the federal policies
involved.'
2
The leading case upholding the validity of the federal rules is
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.13 in which the Court held that Rule 35
requiring a physical examination of a party was within the power of
Congress and did not modify any substantive rights. In Mississippi
7. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). FED. R. Civ. P. 3, provides that an action commences
when the complaint is filed, but a state statute said that the action did not commence
until the summons was served. The summons was not served until after the statute of
limitations barred the action, although the complaint had been filed before the statute
of limitations had run. The Court held that the state law applied and the action was
barred. In Hanna v. Plumer, supra note 2, there was no question about the timeliness
of the service.
8. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). A state statute requiring the plaintiff in a stockholder's
suit to post a bond for security was applied, even though there was no such require-
ment in the federal rule governing the bringing of a suit. The Court said that if the
plaintiff would be deterred from bringing the action in a state court because of his
inability to post the required security, he should be deterred in a federal court also.
9. 337 U.S. 535 (1949). A foreign corporation which had not qualified to do
business in the state was barred from suing in the state by a state statute. The Court
held that it was also barred from bringing an action in a federal court within the
state without discussing rule 17(b) of the FRCP.
10. Applied literally this test would almost nullify the federal rules in diversity
actions, since almost every procedural rule may have a substantial effect upon the
outcome of a case. WicHT, FEDmAL COURTS § 55 (1963). See Merrigan, Erie to
York to Ragan: A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 711 (1950).
11. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). A state court decision indicated that contributory negli-
gence was to be decided by the court rather than the jury. The Court found that
there was a strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury
relationship in federal courts and held that this policy outweighed the policy of having
the same outcome in state and federal courts. No Federal Rule of Civil Procedure was
involved in this case.
12. The two policies actually balanced against each other were the federal policy
of guaranteeing the right to trial by jury and the federal policy of discouraging forum-
shopping by assuring the same result in state and federal courts. The Court also
indicated that it found no strong state policy behind the rule of letting the judge
decide the issue of contributory negligence.
13. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). The majority refused to recognize a category of substantial
procedural rights as a limitation on its power to promulgate rules. The dissenting
opinion did not deny the power of Congress to make such rules, but implied that the
FRCP should not have the force of statutory law.
It should be noted that in this case there was no conflict between the applicable
state and federal law, since, even though the federal court sat in Illinois which did
not allow physical examination of a party, the accident which provoked the litigation
occurred in Indiana where the state rule was the same as the federal rule. This was
as alternative ground for the decision.
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Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,14 the Court held that even though the
application of a federal rule would affect a litigant's rights, it went
only to the manner and means of enforcing state-created rights and
did not "abridge, enlarge, or modify the rules of decision."15 These
cases, however, did not involve a direct conflict between the FRCP
and state statute. The Courts of Appeal, when considering cases
presenting a direct conflict, have usually held the federal rules to
be applicable, but have done so by using the balancing test of
Byrd rather than by looking only to the Enabling Act and the Consti-
tution as did Sibbach.6 This approach has produced much disagree-
ment as to what effect the presence of a federal rule should have as
an indication of federal policy.
In rejecting the defendant's argument that the Erie doctrine re-
quired the use of the state rule, the Court first pointed out that,
even if no federal rule were involved, there would have to be a
balancing of policies under Byrd. The Court indicated that by this
test the federal rule would be applicable, but it did not decide the
case on this ground. A "more fundamental flaw" in defendant's
reasoning was "the incorrect assumption that the rule of Erie . . .
constitutes the appropriate test of the validity ... of a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure." 7 The Court stated that it had never applied the
Erie doctrine to void a federal rule, and distinguished the cases in-
volving a federal rule which applied the Erie doctrine as instances
in which the rule was simply not broad enough to cover the situation.18
Although both the Rules Enabling Act and the Erie rule state that
federal courts must apply state substantive law and federal procedural
14. 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
15. Id. at 445.
16. Wncirr, op. cit. supra note 10, § 59. Some circuits say that only slight weight
should be given to the presence of a federal rule as an indication of federal policy
while others hold that it should be given greater weight.
In Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), a federal court in New York
permitted the substitution of the personal representative of a New Jersey decedent
in a diversity case, even though this would have been impossible in a state court.
In Monarch Ins. Co., v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960), the Court of Appeals
held that the FRCP showed a policy of uniformity within the whole federal system. The
presence of a federal rule was emphasized by this court.
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 2,38 (7th Cir. 1960), the court held
that a state policy was stronger than the federal policy and indicated that it give only
slight weight to the policy of federal uniformity as shown by the FRCP.
Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1963), relied on
both Sibbach, supra note 14, and Byrd, supra note 12, to sustain the application of a
federal rule, stating that whenever a federal rule is involved, it will be applied because
of the afirmative countervailing consideration of a congressional mandate. Id. at 764.
17. Hanna v. Plumer, supra note 2 at 1143.
18. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, felt that the Ragan case, supra note 7, was not
distinguishable and should be overruled. Because he believed that Erie was decided
on a constitutional basis, he would apply the Erie and Byrd tests to determine the
applicability of the FRCP when they conflict with state rules.
2048 [ VOL. 18
law, the tests are different. When a situation is covered by a federal
rule, a federal court must apply it unless it transgresses either the
Rules Enabling Act or the Constitution.
The applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in di-
versity actions has caused confusion since the York case in 1945.
The instant case resolves that difficulty. Now any federal rule,
promulgated under the Enabling Act, must be applied by a federal
court in a diversity action if it is arguably procedural, even if there is a
conflicting state rule. Uniformity of federal procedure is therefore
assured. Achieving uniformity solely by reference to the Enabling
Act and the Constitution, as the Court has done, is preferable to doing
so by using the balancing test of Byrd because of the greater
certainty which the former method provides. Attorneys in diversity
actions may now rely on the FRCP with confidence, knowing that no
opposing federal policy will outweigh that of providing a uniform
federal procedure. The Court rightly concludes that in most cases
the procedural differences on the state and federal levels will not
determine in which court the suit will be brought, and, therefore, this
decision will not result in increased forum-shopping.
Constitutional Law-Televising of Criminal Trials
Held Violative of the Right to a Fair Trial
The Constitution of the United States guarantees to every indi-
vidual both freedom of speech and press' and the right to a fair
trial.2 However, these two fundamental liberties may come in conflict,3
as has been the case in the struggle between the news media and the
courts. This conflict has come to focus at three stages. The first is
before the trial begins, when there is a continuing problem over pre-
trial publicity.4 Here the rule is that newspapers, radio and television
are to be allowed the widest possible latitude consonant with the
orderly administration of justice, so long as the presumption of in-
1. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. The sixth amendment provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
3. See generally Note, 63 HInv. L. REV. 840 (1950); Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1278
(1959); Note, 35 TEMPLE L.Q. 412 (1962).
4. See generally Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. at 1286; 36 Mrss. L.J. 369 (1965).
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nocence is not destroyed. 5 At the second stage after the close of
the trial-few major difficulties arise.6 The separate branches of the
news media are on an equal footing and are free to report anything
about the trial which is not within the prohibited area of libel and
slander.7 It is at the third stage, during the trial itself, that the contro-
versy in question developed. 8 Should criminal trials be televised?
While newspaper reporters are generally permitted inside the court-
room, only two states9 have extended the same privilege to television
cameramen. Canon 35 of the Judicial Canons and the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure expressly exclude television and radio from the
courtroom. The news media insists that such a denial is unjustified.
On the one side, it is argued that to allow radio and television cover-
age throughout the trial would detract from the dignity of the court-
room,10 psychologically affect the participants," and create public
misconceptions of the legal process.' 2 On the other, the contention is
that the refusal of the privilege is a denial of both the right to a
public trial13 and freedom of the press.'
4
The precise issue first squarely faced the United States Supreme
Court in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). In granting certiorari,
the Court limited review to the question of whether requiring peti-
tioner, over his continued objection, to submit to a live telecast of his
trial, denied him due process of law and equal protection of the law
under the fourteenth amendment. The case, involving a charge of
swindling, was originally set for trial on September 24, 1964. At that
time, however, the court heard a defense motion to prevent telecasting,
broadcasting by radio, and news photography. 5 After a two-day
5. E.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (television); Shephard v. Florida,
341 U.S. 50 (1951) (newspapers); Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. Maryland, 193
Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950). But see the very
strict English rule, Gillmore, Free Press and Fair Trial in English Law, 22 WAsh. &
LEE L. REv. 17 (1965).
6. See Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV,. at 1293.
7. 37 TurL. L. REv. 147 (1962).
8. See Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. at 1289.
9. Colorado and Oklahoma. For a detailed discussion of the Colorado and Okla-
homa rules see Warden, Canon 35. Is There Room For Objectivity?, 4 WASInURN
L.J. 211, 221-34 (1965).
10. Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486, 494 (W.D. Pa.
1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 883 (3rd Cir. 1958).
11. See generally Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 RocKY MT.
L. REv. 1 (1960); Griswold, The Standards of the Legal Profession: Canon 35 Should
Not Be Surrendered, 48 A.B.A.J. 615 (1962); Warden, supra note 9, at 212; Note, 51
Ky. L.J. 737, 754-57 (1963).
12. Note, 51 Ky. L.J., at 757.
13. See generally, Note, 35 TEMPLE L.Q. at 419. For a list of seven policy argu-
ments, see id. at 420. Contra, Douglas, supra note 11, at 4.
14. See generally Doubles, A Camera in the Courtroom, 22 WAsHi & LEE L. REv. 1,
9-15 (1965); Warden, supra note 9, at 218; Note, 35 TEMPLE L.Q. at 416.
15. A defense motion for continuance was presented at the same time and granted.
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hearing, which was fully covered by television, radio, and news
photographers, the motion was denied. 16 The trial commenced on
October 22, 1962, and continued for three days. A booth, painted to
blend with the walls, had been constructed at the back of the court-
room in order to conceal all television and newsreel cameras. An
aperture permitted the lenses with an unrestricted view. Only
certain parts of the trial, namely the opening and closing arguments
of the State, the return of the jury's verdict and its receipt by the
trial judge, were carried live with sound. Estes was convicted and
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.17
A close examination of the several opinions is useful in delineating
the policy considerations involved and in indicating the future lines
of development in subsequent cases. Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for
the Court, explained that the issue under review encompassed the
activities of the news media both at the September hearings and at the
actual trial. These combined activities constituted a denial of due
process even in the absence of a showing of specific prejudice.
Furthermore, any future use of television, at its present stage of
technological development, during criminal trials would be inherently
prejudicial and constitute, in itself, a violation of the fourteenth
amendment. "[Ilts use amounts to the injection of an irrelevant factor
into the court proceedings."18 Mr. Justice Clark expressly recognized
the sixth amendment guarantee to the accused of a right to "public"
trial. Even so, he insisted that the freedoms granted in the first
amendment do not extend a right to the news media to televise from
the courtroom. Freedom of the press must necessarily be subject to the
maintenance of fairness in the judicial process, and permitting televi-
sion and radio within the courtroom would inevitably inject prejudice
into the criminal trial. To support his view, Mr. Justice Clark turned
to the potential psychological impact of television upon trial partici-
pants. Jurors, "the nerve center of the fact-finding process," 19 are
influenced by increased pre-trial publicity due to the judge's announce-
ment that the case will be televised, and by continued telecasts of the
proceedings. Awareness that the proceedings are being televised
adds a distraction not otherwise present. Also, witnesses may be "de-
moralized and frightened, [or] . . . cocky and given to overstatement;
16. "Indeed, at least 12 cameramen were engaged in the courtroom throughout
the hearing taking motion and still pictures and televising the proceedings. Cables and
wires were snaked across the courtroom floor, three microphones were on the judge's
bench and others were beamed at the jury box and counsel table. It is conceded that
the activities of the television crews and news photographers led to considerable
disruption of the hearings." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965).
17. Id. at 535.
18. Id. at 544.
19. Id. at 545.
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memories may falter ... and accuracy of statement may be severely
undermined.."20 Further, the judge will have the additional responsibil-
ity of supervising the use of television to assure a fair trial. Should he
be elected to office, there is the tendency to allow telecasting of a trial
to become a political asset.2'1 This makes it difficult for him "to remain
oblivious to the pressures that the news media can bring to bear...
both directly and through the shaping of public opinion."22 Finally,
there will be a decided psychological effect upon the accused. The
presence of television "is a form of mental-if not physical-harass-
ment, resembling a police line-up or a third degree.23 The increased
public clamour from television and radio will inevitably prejudice him.
Furthermore, telecasting may deprive him of effective counsel. "The
distractions, intrusions into confidential attorney-client relationships,
and the temptation offered by television to play to the public audience
might often have a direct effect not only upon the lawyers, but the
judge, the jury and the witnesses."24 In answer to the argument that
to deny televising of criminal trials is to discriminate against the
television industry in favor of newspapers, whose reporters are given
access to the courtroom, Mr. Justice Clark pointed out that "the
television and the radio reporter [have] the same privilege. All are
entitled to the same rights as the general public."25
While Mr. Justice Clark's opinion might be taken as a denial of
access to the courtroom for all television and radio equipment, both at
present and in the future, two express reservations preclude such a
broad interpretation. First, he confined his review to the use of tele-
vision in criminal cases, leaving unanswered the question of the
status of televising civil cases.26 This reservation, however, loses
substantial significance in light of the stated fact that
The necessity for sponsorship weighs heavily in favor of the televising of
only notorious cases, such as this one, and invariably focuses the beam of the
20. Id. at 547.
21. A clear example of this was found in the present case, as pointed out by Chief
Justice Warren in his concurring opinion. The trial judge made the following speech:
"'This case is not being tried under the Federal Constitution. This Defendant has
been brought into this Court under the state laws, under the State Constitution .. .. I
took an oath to uphold this Constitution; not the Federal Constitution but the State
Constitution; and I am going to do my best to do that as long as I preside on this
Court, and if it is distasteful in following my oath and upholding the constitution,
it will just have to be distasteful.'" The Chief justice observed "One is entitled to
wonder if such a statement would be made in a court ol justice by any state trial
judge except as an appeal calculated to gain the favor of his viewing audience." Id.
at 566 (concurring opinion).
22. Id. at 548.
23. Id. at 549.
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 540.
26. Id. at 541.
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lens upon the unpopular or infamous accused. Such a selection is necessary
in order to obtain a sponsor willing to pay a sufficient fee to cover the costs
and return a profit.
27
Secondly, and of more importance, he clearly hesitated to deal with
"future developments in the field of electronics."- Mr. Justice Clark
limited this holding to television in its present stage of technological
development, explicitly recognizing the possibility "that the ever
advancing techniques of public communication and the adjustment
of the public to its presence may bring about a change in the effect of
telecasting upon the fairness of criminal trials."29
It is solely with this second reservation that the concurring opinion
of Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Douglas. and Goldberg,
disagreed. They reasoned that television, regardless of how tech-
nically refined it may become in the future, should not be allowed
access to the courtroom during a criminal 'trial.30 To permit such
intrusion into federal, and state courts would violate the sixth and the
fourteenth amendments. Three reasons were given to justify this
position. The first, inevitable psychological impact upon trial par-
ticipants, differed little from the reasoning of Mr. Justice Clark.31 The
second was that televising of trials would leave the public with a
misconception of the judicial system, detracting from the dignity and
integrity of the trial process.32  To permit the television industry to
invade the courtroom would be a very real threat to both. "The sense
of fairness, dignity and integrity that all associate with the courtroom
would become lost with its commercialization."' Third, the television
industry would necessarily be compelled to "single out certain de-
fendants and subject them to trial under prejudicial conditions not
experienced by others."'' 4 Generally, the nature of the case would be
27. Id. at 549.
28. Id. at 552.
29. Id. at 551.
30. "For the Constitution to have vitality, this Court must be able to apply its
principles to situations that may not have been foreseen at the time those principles
were adopted." Id. at 564 (concurring opinion).
31. See notes 21-26 supra and accompanyinj text.
32. "The television of trials would cause the public to equate the trial process
with the forms of entertainment regularly seen on television and with the commercial
objectives of the industry." 381 U.S. at 571. "There would be a real threat to the
integrity of the trial process if the television industry and the trial judges were allowed
to become partners in the staging of criminal proceedings." Id at 573 (concurring
opinion).
33. Id. at 574 (concurring-opinion). .
34. Id. at 576 (concurring opinion). Chief Justice Warren went on to say, "The
alleged perpetrator of the sensational murder, the fallen idol, or some other person
who, like petitioner, has attracted the public interest would find his trial turned into a
vehicle for television. Yet these are the very persons who encounter the greatest dif-
ficulty in securing an imparital trial, even without the presence of television." Ibid.
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determinative of selection. Viewing the above factors conjunctively,
the three Justices felt compelled to recognize the inherent unfairness
of television in the courtroom and ruled that its presence, both now
and in the future, is necessarily inconsistent with the "fundamental
conception" of what a trial should be.
The television industry, like other institutions, has a proper area of activities
and limitations beyond which it cannot go with its cameras. That area does
not extend to an American courtroom. On entering that hallowed sanctuary,
where lives, liberty, and property of people are in jeopardy, television repre-
sentatives have only the rights of the general public, namely, to be present,
to observe the proceedings, and, thereafter, if they chose, to report them. 35
Mr. Justice Harlan, also concurring, fully agreed with the four above-
mentioned Justices that "television is capable of distorting the trial
process so as to deprive it of fundamental fairness."36 He insisted,
however, upon limiting his opinion only to well publicized and highly
sensationalized trials similar to the one before the court. This does
not mean that he was prepared to say that the constitutional issue
should ultimately turn upon the nature of the particular case, but
only that he would refrain from deciding the question of the use of
television in less sensationalized trials until the appropriate case
should arise. He emphasized that there is no constitutional right of
the news media to televise trials. The right of "public" trial under
the sixth amendment is one belonging only to the accused, not to
the public. "It does not give anyone a concomitant right to photo-
graph, record, broadcast, or otherwise transmit the trial proceedings
to those members of the public not present. . . ."37 The same holds
for the free speech and press guarantees under the first amendment.
"Within the courthouse the only relevant constitutional consideration
is that the accused be accorded a fair trial. If the presence of tele-
vision substantially detracts from the goal, due process requires that
its use be forbidden."38 Under the present circumstances, he was
convinced that permitting television access to the courtroom was in-
herently prejudicial and should be constitutionally banned.
Justices Stewart, Black, Brennan and White dissented. They agreed
that the introduction of television into the courtroom was, at least in
its present state, an extremely unwise policy which invited many
constitutional risks and detracted from courtroom dignity.39 They
were unable, however, due to the probability of further technological
development, to transform these personal views into a constitutional
35. Id. at 585 (concurring opinion).
36. Id. at 588 (concurring opinion).
37. Id. at 589 (concurring opinion).
38. Ibid.
39. Id. at 601 (dissenting opinion).
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rule.40 Nor could they find, in the record, that the "limited televising"
of the trial constituted a denial of any constitutional right. It was
their position that because of the initial refusal to review the claim
that pre-trial publicity prejudiced the jurors, consideration of the
September hearings, insofar as they were an element of that pub-
licity, was not before the Court. As for the trial itself, they could
not find a specific showing of prejudice. The Texas sequestration rule
prevented the jurors from seeing any telecasts of the trial and in-
sulated them from association with the public. In the courtroom,
the trial proceeded no differently than it would have had the cameras
not been present. Furthermore, there was no harassment of the
judge and no resulting confusion. "What ultimately emerges from
the record, therefore, is one bald question-whether the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits all television
cameras from a state courtroom whenever a criminal trial is in
progress."41 This they answered in the negative.42 Mr. Justice Brennan
added a final caveat:
I write merely to emphasize that only four of the five Justices voting to
reverse rest on the proposition that televised criminal trials are constitu-
tionally infirm, whatever the circumstances. . . .Thus, today's decision is
not a blanket constitutional prohibition against the televising of state criminal
trials.
43
The present holding renders it unlikely that a state judge will, in
the future, assume the risk of reversal by granting permission to
televise a criminal trial. In fact, as to television, the fair trial versus
free press controversy may have been laid to rest. Five of the Justices
expressly rejected the media's arguments of right to "public" trial and
absolute freedom of the press. Also, all recognized that the potential
psychological effect of television upon the participants is, at the
very least, a definite constitutional risk. If this does not eliminate
the arguments of the news media, it gravely weakens them. How-
ever no five to four decision can be considered conclusive and, as Mr.
Justice Brennan pointed out, no sweeping constitutional prohibition
has as yet been handed down. The appointment of Mr. Justice Fortas
presents the possibility of a change of position in the future and
leaves unanswered the question of whether future litigation will
ultimately result in an absolute denial of television in the courtroom.
40. Ibid.
41. Id. at 614 (dissenting opinion).
42. "I cannot say at this time that it is impossible to have a constitutional trial when-
ever any part of the proceedings is televised or recorded on television film. I cannot
now hold that the Constitution absolutely bars television cameras from every criminal
courtroom, even if they have no impact upon the jury, no effect upon any witness, and
no influence upon the conduct of the judge." Id. at 615 (dissenting opinion).
43. Id. at 617 (dissenting opinion).
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Labor Law-National Labor Relations Act-
Bargaining Lockout of a Single Employer Held Valid
Having reached a bargaining impasse after a series of good faitl
negotiations, the American Ship Building Company, apprehensive of a
strike in light of past bargaining history, temporarily closed down one
of its shipyards and laid off employees at the other. Shortly thereafter
negotiations were resumed, resulting in a two year contract and the
recalling of all employees. The union then filed an unfair labor
practice complaint with the NLRB, charging American Ship Building
Company with violation of sections 8(a) (1),1 8(a) (3) 2 and 8(a) (5)3
of the National Labor Relations Act. Although the trial examiner
found the employer to have been economically justified and motivated
in its lockout and thus innocent of any unfair labor practice, the
NLRB in a three-to-two decision rejected his analysis that the em-
ployer could have reasonably anticipated a strike. The Board found
that the petitioner's sole purpose was to bring economic pressure to
force a favorable settlement, thus violating sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a) (3) of the Act.4 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed, enforcing the order;5 and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.6 Held, reversed. After a good faith bargaining
impasse has been reached, a temporary lockout to bring economic
pressure in support of an employer's legitimate bargaining position
is not an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations
Act. American Ship Building Company v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300
(1965).
1. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1) (1964), which provides that "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7."
2. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964), which provides in relevant part that "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer-(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or by any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization .. "
3. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5) (1964), which provides in relevant part that "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer- (5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representa-
tives of his employees ...."
4. 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963) (Chairman McCulloch and Member Rogers dis-
senting). The Board made no findings as to the violation of § 8(a) (5) charged in
the complaint. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 306 n.5 (1965).
5. 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
6. 379 U.S. 814 (1964). It is interesting to note that the specific question for
which.the Supreme Court granted certiorari was whether the lockout is the corollary
of the statutory protection given to the employees' right to strike.
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The legality of employer lockouts7 has been a fertile source for legal
controversy.8 Prior to the passage of the NLRA it was generally agreed
that a lockout could be legitimately used as the employer's counterpart
to a strike. 9 Although there were several wartime measures passed
by Congress regulating strikes and lockouts, 10 nowhere-either in the
Wagner Act or any subsequent legislation-is the lockout specifically
outlawed." Nevertheless, despite the fact that it has always decided
each complaint on a case-by-case basis, the Board has- generally,
without any higher judicial objection, held lockouts to be invalid
when designed solely to frustrate organizational efforts, to destroy
or render ineffective the union involved, to evade the duty to bargain
with the union, or to affect a union in any such prohibited manner
12
-all of which involve a strong antiuion motivation. The Board,
however, has established one instance where the lockout may be
used: lockquts justified by the existence of an economic or operational
reason, exclusive of any antiunion motivations. Thus, lockouts solely
motivated by a desire to strengthen the economic position of the
7. No one definition of the term lockout has ever been settled upon. It is here
used as most often quoted in the case law: "A lockout is a cessation of the furnish-
ing of work to employees in an effort to get for the employer more desirable terms."
Iron Molder's Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (7th Cir. 1908) (concurring
opinion); accord, Jeffery-DeWitt Insolator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F.2d 134, 137 (4th Cir.
1937). For a complete discussion of the various meanings attributed to the term, see
Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268, 282-83 (1951).
8. Not only have the NLRB and the courts disagreed as to the legality of these
lockouts, but scholars also take different approaches to the problem. See, e.g., Koretz,
Legality of the Lockout, 4 SmRAcusE L. R-v. 250 (1952); Meltzer, Single-Employer
and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 70
(1956); Sweetall & Aiges, Lockouts, 9 LAB. L.J. 43 (1958).
9. Iron Molder's Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., supra note 5. See also the cases
collected in Annot., 173 A.L.R. 674 (1948). A former Board chairman has expressed
it in the following manner: "In exerting pressure upon employers to recognize them
and accept their demands, unions resort to the strike. . . . (The strike's) counter-
part . . . and matching it fairly accurately, is the lockout." MI.Ls & MONTGoMY,
OGAinzEu LAnon 554 (1945). This statement is typical of the widespread feeling
that exists today among both legal scholars and laymen that the lockout is the corollary
of the strike. See Denbo, Is the Lockout the Corollary of the Strika, 14 LAB. L.J.
400 (1963).
10. War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, § 3, 57 Stat. 164 (1943); H.R. 4908, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (2) (1945).
11. In fact, it is clear from the legislative history of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley
Acts that the congressional purpose was explicitly not to outlaw the lockout as a gun
in the employer's arsenal. See 79 CoNG. REC. 7673 (1935) (remarks of Senator
Walsh concerning the Wagner Act); 93 CoNG. REc. 1827-28, 1893-94 (1947) (remarks
of Senator Walsh concerning the Taft-Hbrtley Act); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 21-24 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1947). Thus, it
is apparently well-settled today that the lockout is not per se invalid and authorities
agree that there is at least some area of legal lockouts. See NLRB v. Dalton Brick
& Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
12. See, e.g., NLRB v. Piedmont Cotton Mills, 179 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1950);
NLRB v. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co., 91 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1937). For a good
summary of similar cases, see Koretz, supra note 8, at 254 n.21.
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employer are unlawful. 13  In addition, after lengthy controversy, 14
the Board finally sanctioned the use of the lockout by a multi-employer
bargaining unit in response to a whipsaw strike against one of its
members. 15 The Board's initial position on this multi-employer situa-
tion made no such exception, holding such a lockout to be an unfair
labor practice. 16 Such a position was strongly challenged by several
Courts of Appeal17 and finally the Board, newly composed of Eisen-
hower appointees, reversed its position to permit a defensive lockout
instituted to protect employers from the whipsaw strike.' 8 Although
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed its holding,
supporting the Board's early view,19 the Supreme Court upheld the
Board 20 and has further strengthened the legality of multi-employer
lockouts with its recent decision of NLRB v. Brown.2'
Until the present case, however, there has remained a conflict among
the circuits as to the legality of single employer lockouts.22 Justice
13. See, e.g., Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951) (to avert loss of
automobiles brought about by sudden work stoppage); International Shoe Co., 93
N.L.R.B. 907 (1951) (to stop repetitive disruption caused by quickie strikes); Duluth
Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943) (to avoid spoilage of materials). See also
Koretz, supra note 8, at 254-57; Meltzer, supra note 8, at 73-76.
14. See notes 16-18 infra and accompanying text.
15. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954).
16. Davis Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1952); Morand Bros. Beverage Co.,
99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1951).
17. See, e.g., NLRB v. Continental Baking Co., 221 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1955);
Davis Furniture Co. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1952); Morand Bros. Beverage
Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), on remand, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
18. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., supra note 15. See also 11 VAND. L. BEv. 246
(1957), for a discussion of the Board's reversal of its position.
19. Truck Drivers Local Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956).
20. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), enforced sub nom.
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
21. NLBB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965). The Court held that in absence of
unlawful, antiunion motivation, a lockout in response to a whipsaw strike against a
multi-employer bargaining group is valid, even though the employer continued opera-
tions with temporary replacements. Again, however, the Court refused to go beyond
the case at hand and specifically reserved the question of permanent replacements.
Id. at 292 n.6. As in the instant case, the fact that there was no unlawful intent, i.e.,
some element of antiunion animus, was the deciding factor. The case in essence
preserves the defensive-offensive dichotomy established by the Board in the Buffalo
Linen case which the Court relied heavily upon to support its decision in Brown. Mr.
Justice White dissented in the case, believing that the Board's balancing was well
within reason and within the policy behind the act (not so irrational as it was in the
instant case in which he concurred) and that the Court should not "assume for itself
the delicate task of weighing the interests." Id. at 299. It appears in light of this
decision, however, that the validity of the defensive lockout in a multi-employer
response to a whipsaw strike is now well-established unless unlawful intent can be
proved.
22. Compare NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., supra note 1; NLRB v. Con-
tinental Baking Co., supra note 17; Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, supra
note 17, with Body & Tank Corp. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964); Utah
Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961);
Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959).
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Stewart's majority opinion implies three major conditions for the
validity of such lockouts. The lockout must occur after a bargaining
impasse has been reached and must involve only a temporary lay-
off; it must serve a legitimate business interest; and it must not
be motivated by an antiunion purpose. In so limiting its decision, 23
the Court found it unnecessary to decide directly the important under-
lying issue of whether the lockout is a corollary to the strike. How-
ever, the majority does take another step toward resolving this
question by emphasizing that the key to the legality of a lockout
is the employer's actual motivation. Thus, under the authority of this
decision an employer has a definite right to lock out his employees
after a bargaining impasse has occurred if he does so merely to better
his economic interests without evidencing an antiunion intent. Con-
sequently, the Court has made a major contribution to the developing
analogy of the strike and lockout;24 and no longer is it so significant
that .the lockout tends to discourage union membership or place the
union at an economic disadvantage so long as its purpose is to serve
some legitimate business interest.25 The Court, in overturning the
Board's decision, also criticizes the Board for attempting to act as
an arbiter of the sort of economic weapons which the parties may
use in collective bargaining.26 There is no uncertainty among the
majority that where the Board makes such an "unauthorized assump-
tion of major policy decisions properly made by Congress" 27 the
Court may set aside the Board's decision. Therefore, though the
Board has been vested with judicial powers and must utilize them
in its function as a quasi-judicial body engaged in the formulation of
policy, it was apparent to the majority that the use of such powers
23. See note 8 supra and the authorities cited therein, which presents a convincing
justification of the analogy between the lockout and the strike. Basically, the feeling
is that the employee has a fundamental right to refuse to work in order to bring
economic pressure to bear on his employer; similarly, the employer has such a right
to cease furnishing work to his employees in an effort to secure a better bargaining
position. In the instant case, the Court implies that this is a valid analogy only, by
sanctioning of the single employer lockout where there is an absence of antiunion intent
and a bargaining impasse has been reached.
24. 380 U.S. at 308. Here the majority states: "What we are concerned with is
the use of a temporary layoff of employees solely as a measure to bring economic
pressure to bear in support of the employer's bargaining position, after an impasse has
been reached. This is the only issue before us, and all that we decide." (Emphasis
added.)
25. 380 U.S. at 311-13. Consequently, the lockout did not violate § 8(a) (3). The
Court also held that the employer's use of a lockout solely in support of a legitimate
bargaining position was not in any way inconsistent with the right to bargain collectively
or with the right to strike; thus, the lockout was held not to violate § 8(a)(1). Id.
at 310.
26. The Court in fact, had expressly forbidden the Board from entering this area
in an earlier decision. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-98
(1959). See also Brief for Petitioner, pp. 22-23, American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB,
supra note 4.
27. Id. at 318.
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should not extend beyond the boundaries of what the Court feels is
acceptable policy making.
In his concurring opinion, Justice White follows an older line of
cases which uphold the right of an employer to lay off employees
because of lack of work.28 In his view, the Court reached out to
decide an issue not even presented by the case; namely, the validity
of the bargaining lockout2 9 in which an employer uses the lockout
to enhance his bargaining position. Although the majority decision
was somewhat limited,30 Justice White apparently felt that the Court
gave complete sanction to all bargaining lockouts.31 In refusing to
overturn the Board's balancing of the conflicting interests where such
findings are supported by substantial evidence, he essentially supports
the view argued by the Board. Although he feels the majority erred
in its failure to give the Board's conclusion due consideration and
in restriking the balance the Board had reached, he concurred because
of his opinion that the Board had erred in its use of the bargaining
lockout analysis to judge the legality of the layoffs when the case
clearly fell into the category of a valid layoff for lack of work. 2
Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren in his concurring
opinion, preferred to decide the case by fitting it into one of the
exceptions set up by the Board; namely, the defensive lockout used
by the employer to guard against unusual problems or economic loss
where he has reasonable grounds for believing a strike to be imminent
upon the termination of a collective bargaining agreement. 33 He
reasoned that the Board had no rational basis for its conclusion that
the employer's fear of a strike was unreasonable. Therefore, he would
have held on this record that the lockout was justified since there
28. See, e.g., Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 785 (1964); H. H. Zimmerli,
133 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1961); Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B.
767 (1953).
29. 380 U.S. at 322.
30. Supra note 24.
31. "The Court today holds that ... a bargaining lockout of employers in resistance
to the demands of a union is invariably exempt from the prescriptions of the Act."
380 U.S. at 318. See also id. at 324, where he comments: "If the Court means
what it says today, an employer may . . . replace his locked-out employees with
temporary help . . . or permanent replacements, and also lock-out long before an
impasse is reached." Contra, id. at 308 n.8. However, the case of Detroit Newspaper
Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, (6th Cir. 1965), gives some support to White's position.
Here the court, relying solely on the American Ship Building case, upheld a lockout
before an impasse had been reached, regarding the findings as to whether the employer's
purpose was solely antiunion or whether it was to bring about a favorable economic
settlement as controlling in determining his intent.
32. 380 U.S. at 322.
33. See, e.g., Packard Bell Electronics Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1961); Betts
Cadillac Olds, Inc., supra note 13; International Shoe Co., supra note 13 (all defensive
lockouts held valid). But see Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., supra note 22 (an
invalid offensive lockout where there was no reasonable belief that a strike was
imminent).
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was no substantial evidence which could support the Board's findings.
In addition, Justice Goldberg commented on the need to avoid
"sweeping generalizations in this complex area."3 4 and to avoid setting
up any "simple formula which readily demarks the permissible from
the impermissible lockout."-" The key to the lockout problem, accord-
ing to the Goldberg analysis, involves a balancing of the conflicting
interests, with due respect for the Board's findings, which can only
be accomplished on a case by case basis.
The Court, in resolving the conflict among the circuits as to the
validity of single employer lockouts, has placed at the employer's
disposal a bargaining weapon which approaches or equals the strength
of the employee's most powerful weapon, the strike. Although the
exact limits of the majority opinion are inconclusive and shadowy, a
major step was taken toward stabilizing an area of labor law which
has had many inconsistencies. 36 There is no specific language in the
Court's opinion to the effect that the lockout is now to be considered
a valid corollary to the strike, but there are definite signs that the
Court was leaning in this direction. In order for a lockout, either by
a single employer or by a multi-employer bargaining unit, to be held
unfair labor practice, the Court now requires some definite evidence
of antiunion intent. The lockout may no longer be held invalid
because it incidentally interferes with or discourages strikes or other
concerted employee activities. If he acts in good faith and not solely
for antiunion purposes, an employer may now successfully lockout his
employees to force a favorable settlement of labor dispute, but accord-
ing to the majority he may do so only after a bargaining impasse has
been reached. In this sense then, it may be implied from the case that
the lockout is the corollary of the strike, since it is now held to be
a valid method whereby the employer may exert economic pressure
on the union after a bargaining impasse has been reached;3 7 and
today this is true irrespective of whether it is used by a single em-
ployer or a multi-employer bargaining unit. Such distinctions are no
longer necessary because the Court sets out the same rule for both
34. 380 U.S. at 338.
35. Id. at 341.
36. The most crucial of the inconsistencies was the fact that the Board allowed the
multi-employer lockout whereas they failed to allow a single employer lockout. Both
this distinction and the one between the defensive and offensive lockout have led to
many inconsistencies in the law and have been highly criticized as being completely
useless. See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 10-12, American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra
note 4; Meltzer, supra note 7, at 82-84.
37. In fact, the Court appears to give sanction to the following statement by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: "The temporary lockout should be recognized
for what it actually is, i.e., the employer's means of exerting economic pressure on the
Union, a corollary of the Union's right to strike." Morand Bros. Beverage Co., supra
note 16, at 582. (Emphasis added.) See also note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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situations, and, in effect, establishes the lockout as the corollary to
the strike.38
It is much too early to judge the ultimate effect of this decision.
The Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit39 has already interpreted the
case quite broadly, holding that any bargaining lockout even before an
impasse has been reached is valid so long as no antiunion intent is
discernible. There may be, however, some question as to whether the
other circuits will follow such a broad interpretation in light of the
limits the Court placed upon the issue.40 In all probability, decisions
as to the validity of lockouts will continue to require a close analysis
of the facts on an ad hoc basis. It is now clear, however, that if the
employer can satisfy the Board and the courts that following a
bargaining impasse, he is using the lockout as an economic weapon
within the framework of collective bargaining and not solely as an
antiunion weapon, his action will be upheld.
Power To Compel United States Attorney To
Sign Indictments Returned by Grand Jury
The foreman of the federal grand jury for the Southern District of
Mississippi desired to have indictments prepared against two Negroes
accused of violating perjury laws when they testified in federal voter
discrimination cases. The United States Attorney for the Southern
District refused to prepare or sign these indictments because of in-
structions he had received from the Acting Attorney General of the
United States. The federal district judge ordered the attorney to
draft such true bills or no bills as the grand jury might return and
to sign said bills in accordance with the requirements of rule 7(c)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.' Upon refusal to prepare
and sign the indictments returned by the grand jury, the United
38. It is important to realize, however, that even prior to this decision, most authori-
ties and labor and management officials in actuality looked to the lockout as the
corollary of the strike. See Brief for Petitioner, p. 14, American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, supra note 4. For data supporting the conclusion that most labor and manage-
ment officials agree on the permissability of the lockout, see U.S. BuBn. u or LABOR
STAlsnics, DEP'T OF LABOR BULL. No. 908-13.
39. Supra note 31.
40. Supra note 24. It will be interesting to see what effect the hiring of permanent
replacements will have since this question was specifically reserved by the Court.
1. FED. R. Caum. P. 7(c), in referring to indictments states: "It shall be signed
by the attorney for the government." Since the rule uses the word "shall," the
signature of the government attorney becomes a necessary element in order to create
a valid indictment. Yet, this does not mean that the attorney is under a duty to sign
the indictment, as the case holds.
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States Attorney was adjudged in civil contempt of court. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held, in a four to three
decision, reversed. The United States Attorney cannot be compelled
to sign indictments returned by the grand jury. United States v.
Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
Circuit Judge Jones, joined by Chief Judge Tuttle, wrote the
opinion for the court in which he stated that the United States
Attorney should not be required to prepare or sign the indictments
returned by the grand jury. Judge Wisdom, in a special concurring
opinion, agreed with the reasoning of the majority, but emphasized
the broad discretion of the government attorney in prosecuting cases.
Judge Brown, while concurring with the court's reversal of the con-
tempt order, offered a compromise which would require the attorney
to prepare the indictments, but not compel him to sign them.
2
In order to understand the significance of the instant case, it is
necessary to review the traditional functions of the grand jury and
of the United States Attorney.3 It has been stated that:
The grand jury serves two great functions. One is to bring to trial persons
accused of crime upon just grounds. The other is to protect persons against
unfounded or malicious prosecutions by insuring that no criminal proceed-
ing will be undertaken without a disinterested determination of probable
guilt. The inquisitorial function has been called the most important. 4
Thus, it appears that the primary purpose of the grand jury is to
insure that an individual will not be prosecuted without just cause.5
However, the grand julr is not only under a duty to protect individ-
uals from unwarranted charges; it also has the power to see that
corrupt conditions are remedied. 6 The Constitution of the United
2. Circuit Judges Rives, Gewin, and Bell dissented, on grounds that the government
attorney should be required to draft and sign the indictments.
3. The constitutional mandate reads: "No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
grand jury, . . ." U. S. CoNsT. amend. V. The prosecuting body is in the office of
the Attorney General. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1950, 64 Stat. 1261, 5 U.S.C. §
133 (z)-15 (1958); 28 U.S.C. § 507 (1958); Exec. Order No. 6166, 5 U.S.C. § 132
(1958).
4. Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 394 (1959). 4 WmATON,
Ca naxAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1710 (12th ed. 1957): "The function of the
grand jury, which is regarded at common law as an informing and accusing body
rather than as a judicial tribunal, is, as a general rule, the investigation of crimes,
primarily with a view to determine against whom, if anyone, there is sufficient suspicion
to warrant holding him for trial." Application of United Elec. Workers, 111 F. Supp.
858, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
5. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Application of United Elec.
Workers, supra note 4, at 863; United States v. Atlantic Comm. Co., 45 F. Supp. 187,
192 (E.D.N.C. 1942); 4 WHARTON, Op. cit. supra note 4; WHrMAN, FEDERAL CRMINAL
PnocEm E § 6.5 (1950); Orfield, supra note 4; Note, 4 STAN. L. RLv. 68.71 (1951).
6. United States v.. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Orfield,
supra note 4, at 436.
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States authorizes the grand jury either to "present or indict."7 In the
federal courts, the presentment,8 though "obsolete,"9 is still available
In order to carry out its accusatorial and inquisitorial functions, the
grand jury possesses broad power to inquire into and investigate all
matters brought before it.11 Thus, it can make an impartial detelmina-
tion as to the existence or non-existence of grounds for prosecution.
Therefore, before any individual charged with a capital or infamous
crime can be brought to trial, an indictment must be issued against
him.12 The power to return indictments rests solely with the grand
jury, and
while the court may exercise an influence over the [grand jury] proceed-
ings, there is neither a method whereby an indictment can be peremptorily
required, nor, on the other hand, is there any method of preventing the
presentment of an indictment except by summary discharge.' 3
After indictments have been returned by the grand jury in federal
cases, the duty of prosecuting is performed by the Attorney General of
the United States14 and the duly appointed United States Attorneys
who serve each district.'5 "[T]he United States Attorney is vested
with broad discretion to protect the public from crime, such discretion
being derived both from statutory grant and the authority of the
Attorney General at common law." 6 The courts cannot compel him
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. "A presentment differs from an indictment in that it is an accusation made by
the grand jury of their own motion either upon their own observation and knowledge,
or upon evidence before them; while an indictment is preferred as the suit of the
government, and is usually framed in the first instance by the prosecuting officer
of the government, and by him laid before the grand jury, to be found or ignored."
BLAcx, LAs DIcnoNARY 912 (4th ed. 1951).
9. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 61 (1906); Application of United Elec. Workers,
supra note 4, at 863 n.13; WARToN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1723; Orfield, stupra
note 4, at 437.
10. Hale v. Henkel, supra note 9, at 61; In the Matter of April 1956 Term Grand
Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1956).
11. Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 163 (1885); United States ex rel.
McCann v. Adams, 3 F.R.D. 396, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
12. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 6 (1887). Of course, under
FED. B. Cmm. P. 7(b), the defendant may waive his right to an indictment.
13. United States v. Smyth, supra note 6, at 292.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1964); Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932);
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922); Parker v. Kennedy, 212 F. Supp.
594, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1958): "(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, it
shall be the duty of each United States attorney, within his district, to: (1) prose-
cute for all offenses against the United States ....
16. Fay v. Miller, 183 F.2d 986, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Other cases emphasizing
this broad discretion are United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 412-13, 415
(1920); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868); Dear Wing Jung
v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1962); Goldberg v. Hoffman, 22,5 F.2d
463, 466 (7th Cir. 1955); District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17, 20 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762, 764 (D.D.C. 1963); United States
2.064 [ VOL. 18
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to prosecute an action.17 The courts have "no general supervisory
powers over the United States Attorney; he is a public official having
independent responsibilities as such." 8 The remedy for any derelic-
tion of duty rests not with the courts, but with the executive branch.19
Circuit Judge Jones thought it an act of futility to require the
attorney to prepare an indictment which he would refuse to validate
by signing.20 The court reasoned that "the constitutional provision
[indictment by grand jury] is not to be read as conferring on or
preserving to the grand jury, as such, any rights or prerogatives,"21
and emphasized that "the constitutional provision is . . . for the
benefit of the accused."22 The grand jury's role was viewed as being
"restricted to a finding as to whether or not there is probable cause
to believe that an offense has been committed."2 3 This view appears
to overlook the accusatorial function of the grand jury through the
power of the presentment;2 but the probable reason for the majority's
narrow statement is that proceedings by presentment are seldom used
in the federal courts.25 The majority recognized the wide discretion
of the United States Attorney in deciding whether to prosecute a
case against an individual.26 It reiterated the long established view
v. Verra, 203 F. Supp. 87, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630,
634-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), which said: "[I]t is, nevertheless, clear beyond question
that it is not the business of the Courts to tell the United States Attorney to perform
what they conceive to be his duties. . . . The prerogative of enforcing the criminal
law was vested by the Constitution, therefore, not in the Courts, nor in private citizens,
but squarely in the executive arm of the government. Congress has implemented
the powers of the President by conferring the power and the duty to institute prosecu-
tion for federal offenses upon the United States Attorney for each district. . . . The
federal courts are powerless to interfere with his discretionary power." (Emphasis
added.); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. II. 1945); United States
v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262 (D. Mont. 1924).
17. Goldberg v. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 467; Parker v. Kennedy, supra note 14, at
594; Pugach v. Klein, supra note 16, at 635: "The Court cannot compel him [United
States Attorney] to prosecute a complaint, or even an indictment, whatever his
reasons for not acting." Howell v. Brown, 85 F. Supp. 537, 538 (D. Neb. 1949):
"Put briefly, no power of jurisdiction is vested in this court to control, whether by
writ or mandamus or otherwise, the exercise by the United States Attorney of the
discretion and judgment which the law entrusts to him in the prosecution of persons
suspected of the violation of the laws of the United States." Milliken v. Stone, 7
F.2d 397, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
18. United States v. Cohen, 231 F. Supp. 171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
19. Pugach v. Klein, supra note 16, at 635; United States v. Brokaw, supra note 16,
at 103; Milliken v. Stone, supra note 17.
20. Judge Wisdom, who voted with the majority, concurred specially. He reasoned
that the attorney for the government has broad discretion in deciding whether to
prosecute cases, and that by withholding his signature and refusing to prepare indict-
ments, he was properly exercising this discretion.
21. 342 F.2d at 170.
22. Ibid.
23. Id. at 171.
24. See cases cited note 10 supra.
25. See cases cited note 9 supra.
26. See cases cited notel6 supra.
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that courts are not to interfere with this discretion.27 Since the United
States Attorney's refusal to sign8 the indictment returned by the
grand jury renders it invalid, the majority did not agree that the
signature of the prosecuting attorney is merely an "attestation of the
act of the grand jury"29 and thus not actually a part of the indict-
ment.30 The court stated "that the requirement of the signature is for
the purpose of evidencing the joinder of the attorney for the United
States with the grand jury in instituting a criminal proceeding in the
Court."31 Under this view the signature on the indictment initiates
the institution of a prosecution; and because of his discretionary
power in beginning criminal proceedings, the attorney for the govern-
ment cannot be compelled to sign the indictment.
32
The three justices who dissented argued that the attorney for the
government could be compelled to draft and sign the indictments
returned by the grand jury. The dissent placed much emphasis on
several cases33 which state that mere failure to sign the indictment
does not cause it to be invalid. In one of the early cases interpreting
the effect of the United States Attorney's signature in relation to
rule 7(c), it was held that "the signature of the prosecuting attor-
ney is no part of the indictment and is necessary only as evidence of
the authenticity of the document. . . ."4 The dissent reasoned that
since the signature is not part of the indictment, but only attests to
the action of the grand jury, the prosecuting attorney could be com-
pelled to perform the purely ministerial act of signing the indictments.
While the cases relied on by the dissent appear to support this
position, it is significant to note that all these cases involved mere
technicalities concerning the method of signing the indictment, rather
than a refusal by the United States Attorney to sign.35 Such technical
27. See cases cited note 17 supra.
28. FED. R. Crm. P. 7(c).
29. 342 F.2d at 171. The court does not view the cases which the dissenters cited in
note 33 infra as authority, for in all of these cases a mere technical deficiency was
the cause of the disagreement; whereas, in the instant case the failure of the prosecutor
to sign involves no technicality.
30. The court says that without the United States Attorney's signature, the indictment
is invalid. 342 F.2d at 171. This clearly indicates that the majority think the
attorney's signature is definitely a part of the indictment.
31. 342 F.2d at 172.
32. See cases cited in notes 16 and 17 supra.
33. In re Lane, 135 U.S. 443, 449 (1890); Abramson v. United States, 326 F.2d
565, 567 -(5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Keig, 334 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1964);
Wiltsey v. United States, 222 F.2d 600-01 (4th Cir. 1955); Wheatley v. United States,
159 F.2d 599-601 (4th Cir. 1946).
34. Wheatley v. United States, supra note 33, at 600.
35. See cases cited note 33 supra. It must be noted that in all these cases the ques-
tions involved was not a refusal of the prosecuting attorney to sign, but merely some
technical deficiency in the manner in which the indictment was signed. The dissenters
cite no case holding that the court can compel the prosecutor to sign the indictments.
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errors would seem to come within the harmless error provision of rule
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 36 In the instant
case, there was no harmless error; there was simply a refusal by the
United States Attorney to prosecute, and this power to refuse to
prosecute cannot be modified by the courts.37 The dissenters freely
admit the wide discretion of the prosecutor in instituting actions.38
However, according to their view, the proper method for the prose-
cuting attorney to follow in exercising his discretion not to prosecute
a case would be first to move for dismissal under rule 48(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 9 and if this motion is denied,
then to enter a nolle prosequi.4° The dissent indicated the desirability
of public disclosure of the prosecuting attorney's reasons for wanting
an indictment dismissed.41 Even though the dissent does not so state,
it appears to interpret the use of the word "shall" in rule 7(c) as
demanding the signature of the government attorney.42
Circuit Judge Brown, though voting with the majority, nevertheless
agreed with the dissent that the attorney should be compelled to
prepare the indictments returned by the grand jury. This reasoning
may not seem logical, since it would appear meaningless to require
the government attorney to draft indictments which he did not
intend to validate by signing. Judge Brown reasoned, however, that
in order for the grand jury and prosecuting attorney to function
properly, it is necessary to have someone prepare the indictments.
Certainly the grand jury does not have the requisite legal skill to
fulfill this function. Since it has traditionally been the function of
36. FED. R. Cnmr. P. 52(a): "(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity
or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
37. See cases cited in note 17 supra.
38. 342 F.2d at 179.
39. FED. R. Cum. P. 48(a): "The Attorney General or the United States attorney
may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and
the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during
the trial without the consent of the defendant."
40. 342 F.2d at 179. The dissent cites from United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt
& Neckwear Contractors Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 483, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), which indi-
cates clearly the prosecutor's discretion in instituting actions: "The Attorney General
is the head of the Department of Justice, a part of the Executive branch of the
Government. Even were leave of Court to the dismissal of the indictment denied,
the Attorney General would still have the right to adhere to the Department's view
that the indictment cannot be supported by proof upon a trial of the merits, and
accordingly, in the exercise of his discretion, decline to move the case for trial. The
Court in that circumstance would be without power to issue a mandamus or other
order to compel prosecution of the indictment, since such a direction would invade
the traditional separation of powers doctrine."
41. 342 F.2d at 179: "That refusal [to proceed on an indictment] will, of course,
be in open court and not in the secret confines of the grand jury room."
42. 342 F.2d at 177: "It is not for us to pass upon the wisdom of requiring such
authentication. It is enough that the law [rule 7(c)] provides for the indictment to
be authenticated by the signature of the attorney for the government."
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the prosecuting attorney to prepare indictments, 43 this reasoning
has some merit.
The case is significant with respect to rule 7(c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the holding clearly indicates that
the signature of the prosecuting attorney is definitely a part of the
indictment, and that in order for there to be a valid indictment, the
signature must be present. Thus, the statute of limitations will con-
tinue to run even after the grand jury returns an indictment, and
will be tolled only when the United States Attorney signs the docu-
ment. This decision in no way derogates from the authority of the
grand jury, as the dissent presupposes; it remains the only body
possessing the power to return an indictment.44 Its power is inde-
pendent and discretionary45; it cannot be required by the court to
return an indictment 6; and it is under no duty "to follow the orders
of the prosecutors" 47 in respect to matters before it. The principal
case, while recognizing the wide discretion of the prosecuting attorney
in instituting prosecutions, reaffirms the efficacy of rule 48(a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,48 which was designed to
protect the defendant4 9 and not to control the discretion of the pro-
secuting attorney. The power of the prosecuting attorney in refusing
to initiate a suit on an "indictment" returned by the grand jury pro-
vides a check on "runaway grand juries"; for public policy5 and
other reasons may require that a prosecution not initiated against
certain individuals. In federal cases the discretion and power to
prosecute is for the United States Attorney.51 This power is preserved
by this decision.
43. United States v. Bnmfield, 85 F. Supp. 696, 704 (W.D. La. 1949): "It is
common knowledge, to those who are familiar with the practice, that the District
Attorney, or someone in his office, in a large percentage of cases, prepares the indict-
ment.... .. HousEL & WAiSER, DFENDiNmn AND PROSECUTINo FEDERAL CHI1UNAL
CASES § 220 (2d ed. 1946); 5 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2017; Orfield, supra
note 4, at 425.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
45. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960); United States v. Smyth,
supra note 6, at 293-94.
46. United States v. Smyth, supra note 6.
47. Id. at 294.
48. FED. R. Caim. P. 48(a).
49. Woodring v. United States, 311 F.2d 417, 424 (8th Cir. 1963).
50. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAW &
CoN=Ew. PRoB. 64 (1948).
51. See cases cited in note 16 supra.
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Taxation-Federal Excise Tax-Discrimination and
Abuse of Discretion Under Section 7805(b)
In April 1955, Remington Rand requested a ruling1 from the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue concerning the excise tax status
2
of certain of its computer systems. Two days later the Commissioner
wired Remington Rand a favorable private ruling. Having learned
of the excise tax exemption granted its largest competitor, plaintiff
IBM, sought a ruling in July 1955 as to the tax status of its own
computer. The request for the ruling contained all the necessary
information and was captioned "Urgentl Please Expedite." Shortly
after this request was instituted, both the plaintiff and Remington
Rand filed claims for refunds for periods prior to 1955. Thereafter,
Remington Rand was refunded taxes paid between 1952 and 1955.
On May 1, 1957, however, the Commissioner notified Remington Rand
that after further study the Internal Revenue Service had decided
that the computers in question were taxable. The revocation of the
earlier favorable ruling did not go into effect, however, until February
1, 1958, and operated prospectively only. The effect of the refund and
ruling combined, was to free Remington Rand from collecting the
excise tax on its computers sold over a six year period. The Com-
missioner did not respond to plaintiff's request for a ruling for more
than two years, until November 26, 1957, when he notified plaintiff
that its computers were taxable as business machines. Plaintiff then
1. "A ruling is a written statement issued to a taxpayer or his authorized representa-
tive by the National Office which interprets and applies the tax laws to a specific set
of facts .... ." Rev. Proc. 28, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 496, 497. A private ruling is
valid only if the facts under which it was granted were true, and remains valid only
so long as the facts do not change. Mid-Ridge Inv. Co. v. United States, 214 F.
Supp. 8 (E.D. Wis. 1962). The Commissioner takes the position that he is in no
way bound by these rulings, and that "a.ruling ...may be revoked or modified at
any time in the wise administration of the taxing statutes. ... Rev. Proc. 28, 1962-2
Cu . BULL. 496, 504. If a ruling is revoked, that revocation automatically is ap-
plicable to all the previous taxable years' unless the Commissioner wishes to limit the
retroactive effect by using "the discretionary powers granted to him under § 7805(b)
of the Code . Re. v" Proc. 28, supra. It is the general policy of the Commissioner
not to revoke a private letter ruling retroactively. Rev. Proc. 28, supra at 505. In
the words of Mortimer Caplin (then Commissioner of Internal Revenue), "advance
rulings contribute substantially to reasonable and orderly administration of the tax
laws, and their issuance is of mutual advantage to taxpayers and Government."
Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A Statement of
Principles, N.Y.U. 20T- INST. ON FED. TAx 1, 6 (1962). Mr. Caplin also states that
the use of rulings (1) gives the taxpayer a measure of certainty, (2) serves to
minimize future litigation, (3) creates uniformity in the application of law and regu-
lations, (4) contributes to fair and economical tax administration. Caplin, supra at
8. See Lynn & Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of Discretion as Applied Against
the United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 TAx L. REv. 487, 508-09 (1964).
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4191. This section applies an excise tax to sales of
business machines. The tax is collected by the seller directly from the purchaser.
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filed a second refund claim for the period from June 1, 1955, to Jan-
uary 31, 1958. The Commissioner disallowed both refund claims,
holding plaintiff liable for the excise tax for roughly the same period
during which Remington Rand was relieved of the tax. The Court of
Claims held, refund granted. The refusal of the Commissioner to
exercise his power to limit the retroactive application of his ruling
was, under the circumstances, an abuse of discretion. International
Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
Section 7805(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19543 was
designed to reduce the hardship resulting from the mandatory retro-
active tax collection by the Internal Revenue Service.4 The statute
was "intended to provide the Treasury with power to apply changes in
position prospectively when in its discretion it wished to so limit the
change."5 It is now settled that the Commissioner can abuse his dis-
cretion,6 and that whether he has done so is a question subject to
judicial review.7 Normally, abuse of discretion is found when a
taxpayer is given a ruling and relies on it, only to have the ruling
revoked retroactively 8 Retroactive revocation can be extremely harm-
ful in an excise tax situation, since an arbitrary excise tax ruling with
retroactive effect can seriously injure a business by wiping out past
profits.9 Abuse of discretion may also be found when the Commissioner
issues an arbitrary ruling which favors or injures certain taxpayers and
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7805(b): "Retroactivity of Regulations or Rulings-
The Secretary or his delegate may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling
or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive
effect."
4. Section 506 the 1934 Act was the direct predecessor of § 7805(b) of the
1954 Code. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 506, 48 Stat. 757. This act gave the
Commissioner the power to limit the retroactive effect of rulings as well as regulations
and Treasury decisions. "[I]n some cases the application of regulations, Treasury
Decisions, and rulings to past transactions .which have been closed by taxpayers in
reliance upon existing practice, will work such inequitable results that it is believed
desirable to lodge in the Treasury Department the power to avoid these results by
applying certain regulations, Treasury Decisions, and rulings with prospective effect
only." H.R. REp. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1934).
5. Lynn & Gerson, supra note 1, at 507.
6. See Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 185 (1957); Lesavoy
Foundation v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1959).
7. Goodstein v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959).
8. Lesavoy Foundation v. Commissioner, .supra note 6.
9. See Exchange Parts Co. v. United States, 279 F.2d 251 (Ct. Cl. 1960). There
is a great need for fair excise tax administration due to the tremendous competitive
factors involved in passing the tax on to the ultimate consumer. If a company were
to rely on a ruling, and not pass the tax on to the customer, and the ruling were
revoked with retroactive effect, the tax for the period of reliance might be greater
than the profit for the same period. Equality of treatment is also necessary in excise
taxation, since exemption of one company would allow the company to undersell its
competitors. See generally, Caplin, supra note 1, at 22-23.
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not others who are in similar situations. 10 In Automobile Club v. Com-
missioner," the Supreme Court indicated that the Commissioner can
abuse his discretion under section 7805(b), but that since all the
taxpayers in the case were treated equally, the acts of the Commis-
sioner did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 12 Though the Court
did not find an abuse of discretion, the opinion clearly recognized
the importance of equality in taxation, and pointed out that the
Commissioner could not use his power of revocation in a discrimina-
tory or arbitrary manner.' 3 The ideal of equality in taxation has been
the basis for numerous tax refund suits.' 4 In these cases, the suc-
cess of the suit depended upon the Court's response to the Com-
missioner's reasons for treating similar taxpayers differently.' 5 In
Exchange Parts Co. v. United States,16 the Commissioner revoked a
prior ruling, and conditioned retroactivity on whether the taxpayer
had previously been paying the tax. The Court of Claims decided
that payment or non-payment was not a rational basis of classification,
and that the ruling was discriminatory and therefore an abuse of
discretion. The same classification was used by the Commissioner in
Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v. United States.'7 The court recog-
nized the legality of the tax in question, but was not satisfied with
the Commissioner's actions because they resulted in discrimination.' 8
The Commissioner had applied different standards to identical tax-
10. Automobile Club v. Commissioner, supra note 6, City Loan & Sav. Co. v.
United States, 177 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ohio 1959); aff'd, 287 F.2d 612 (6th Cir.
1961); Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 907 (Ct. Cl.
1956).
11. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
12. Id. at 186.
13. "On the contrary, it is clear from the language of the section . . . that Congress
thereby confirmed the authority of the Commissioner to correct any ruling . . .
retroactively, but empowered him, in his discretion, to limit retroactive application
to the extent necessary to avoid inequitable results." Id. at 184. (Emphasis added.)
14. See Exchange Parts Co. v. United States, supra note 9; Weller v. Commissioner,
270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908 (1960); Wolinsky v. United
States, 271 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1959); City Loan & Say. Co. v. United States, supra
note 10; Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v. United States, supra note 10.
15. If the court were satisfied that a valid distinction between the taxpayers existed,
it would not consider the Commissioner's actions arbitrary or discriminatory. See
Weller v. Commissioner, supra note 14. In Weller v. Commissioner the taxpayer never
requested a ruling, and the court found that he had been treated equally with other
taxpayers who had not been issued a ruling. In Arnold A. Schwartz, 40 T.C. 191 (1963),
the taxpayer owned certain investment certificates which were similar to those declared
non-taxable in an earlier case. He objected to the taxation of his certificates, while
other certificates similar to his were not taxed. The court did not consider this dis-
crimination because there was some distinction between the types of certificates.
16. Supra note 9.
17. Supra note 10.
18. "We think that the law in action cannot be so divorced from the law in the
books as to make the latter applicable only to an occasional unfortunate who happened
to pay his taxes on the basis of the law in the books." Id. at 909.
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payers without a "rational basis for the difference." 19 In the great
majority of the cases denying refunds sought on these grounds, the
courts were able to see a rational and non-arbitrary basis for the
distinction between taxpayers,20 even though the taxpayers' situations
were strikingly similar 2 ' It has also been the policy of the courts to
deny suits which involve reliance by one taxpayer on a private ruling
issued to another.2 Even though the taxpayers have been in similar
situations,2 mere reliance has not been enough to allow the courts
to grant relief. In order to avoid the harsh results of arbitrary tax rul-
ings, the courts have utilized three principal methods to prevent the
Commissioner from asserting tax deficiences: (1) quasi-estoppel, 24
(2) abuse of discretion under section 7805(b), 2 and (3) discrimi-
nation.26 While these methods have only minority support, it appears
that the courts have grown more interested in equitable solutions
to unfair tax rulings and are willing to study claims for refunds with
the above-mentioned methods in mind.
27
In the instant case, the court first determined that in specified areas
19. In the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "The only reason urged in this case
for holding the Commissioner bound to follow rulings of non-taxability which le
considers inapplicable is respect for an overriding principle of 'equal' tax treatment.
The Commissioner cannot tax one and not tax another without some rational basis
for the difference." United States v. Kaiser, 353 U.S. 299, 308 (1960). (Emphasis
added.)
20. Wolinsky v. United States, supra note 14, is the exception. In this case the
taxpayer had paid excise taxes while other taxpayers similarly situated had not. The
Commissioner revoked the other taxpayers' private rulings prospectively, but would
not allow any refunds. In this case, the taxpayer did not obtain knowledge of the
ruling until shortly before its change by the Internal Revenue Service. The court,
without clear explanation of its reasoning, concentrated on the lack of detrimental
reliance by the taxpayer and ignored the possible question of discrimination. In
Wolinsky, however, there was no negligence on the part of the Internal Revenue
Service, nor any pattern of obvious, knowing discrimination.
21. Weller v. Commissioner, supra note 14; Arnold A. Schwartz, supra note 14;
Goodstein v. Commissioner, 267.F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959).
22. See Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672 (1962); Pomeroy Co-op.
Grain Co. v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1961); Goodstein v. Commissioner,
supra note 20.
23. Weller v. Commissioner, supra note 14; Arnold A. Schwartz, supra note 15.
24. See Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962); Simmons v.
United States, 308 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1962); Smale & Robinson, Inc. v. United
States, 123 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Cal. 1954). For a thorough discussion of quasi-
estoppel, abuse of discretion, and discrimination, see Lynn & Gerson, supra note 1.
25. See Lesavoy Foundation v. Commissioner, supra note 6.
26. See Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v. United States, supra note 10; City Loan
& Say. Co. v. United States, supra note 10.
27. Even in cases in which the court has denied relief-Weller v. Commissioner,
supra note 14; Goodstein v. Commissioner, supra note 20-the courts examined the
actions of the Commissioner carefully for arbitrary action, and indicate that if there
had been discrimination or an abuse of discretion, the courts would have been more
hesitant to rule in favor of the Commissioner.
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of taxation,28 Congress has adopted a strong policy of equality of
taxation among "competitors or persons in the same or comparable
situation." When Congress has established a policy which demands
equality, the courts are bound to give effect to the congressional
mandate. The court pointed out that section 7805(b) obliges the
Commissioner to use his discretion to avoid unequal treatment of
taxpayers who are identically situated. The Commissioner must "con-
sider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the handling down
of a ruling-including the comparative or differential effect on the
other taxpayers in the same class."30 Secondly, the court found that
the actions of the Commissioner did not satisfy the court's standard
of fair tax administration. Since the Commissioner knew that his
actions could in all probability result in competitive disadvantage to
the plaintiff, he "was compelled to decide that the ruling given to
IBM should be 'applied without retroactive effect' so as to place the
two competitors on the same plane."31 The Commissioner could not
collect any of the taxes which Remington Rand had been excused
from paying,32 and could only equalize the situation by freeing the
plaintiff from the same taxes for the same time period. Since the
Commissioner failed to use the powers granted him under section
7805(b) to equalize the comparative tax burden, the court, after
examining his previous discrimination, viewed this failure as an abuse
of discretion. The typical situation in which the Commissioner is held
to have abused his discretion occurs when a taxpayer relies on a
personal, private ruling which is later retroactively revoked.3 In the
28. The court indicated that Congress passed § 7805(b) as a mandate of fair
treatment in the area of rules and regulations. The court reasoned that § 7805(b)
is a direct congressional command to the Commissioner to make every effort to afford
equal treatment to similar taxpayers. The court found that § 7805(b) has three
consequences for those who seek rulings from the Internal Revenue Service: (1)
The section is congressional authorization for the non-collection of past taxes which
would otherwise be due under the substantive taxing provisions, (2) the Commissioner
must consider the totality of circumstances in handing down a ruling, and (3) the
Commissioner's discretion is subject to review. 343 F.2d at 919-20.
29. Id. at 919.
30. Id. at 920.
31. Id. at 923.
32. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1108(b), 44 Stat. (pt. 2) 114, states in relevant
part: "No tax shall be levied, assessed, or collected under the provisions of Title VI
of this Act on any article sold or leased by the manufacturer ... if at the time of
the sale or lease there was an existing ruling ... holding that the sale or lease of
such article was not taxable, and the manufacturer . . . parted with possession or
ownership of such article, relying on the ruling..... See generally Beaman, How
Much Reliance on a Revenue Ruling? Law Forbids Some Retroactive Revocations, 13 J.
TAx-noN 22 (1960).
33. "Hence, abuse of discretion may be involved only if a taxpayer fully and
honestly discloses a factual context; receives a letter ruling which purports to apply
the law to the facts; relies upon the ruling to his detriment; and is damaged by an
asserted retroactive revocation." Lynn & Gerson, supra note 1, at 509.
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instant case, IBM was never issued a ruling upon which to rely prior
to the 1957 notification, which merely confirmed the tax that had
already been paid. Though there was no reliance on the part of IBM,
the court viewed the power to limit retroactivity as the proper remedy
for the previous discriminatory treatment. Since the Commissioner
caused the injustice, it was his duty to remedy the situation. His
failure to issue a prompt ruling, when combined with the gentle
treatment accorded Remington Rand, set up a pattern of discrimina-
tion which the court refused to accept. The concept that one taxpayer
cannot rely on a private ruling issued to another was not important to
the court because IBM had not tried to rely on the ruling issued to
Remington Rand, and had requested its own ruling on identical
subject matter. The plaintiff had a right, according to the court, to
receive a ruling, and the Commissioner had the duty to act in the light
of the Congressional policy of equality. His subsequent failure to act
was contrary to the tax policy established by Congress, and consti-
tuted an abuse of the discretion granted by Congress under section
7805(b). The principles of fair tax administration demanded that
the court afford IBM the relief which it was granted.m
The decision should prove a valuable aid in assuring equitable
tax administration and in eliminating competitive advantages which
the Internal Revenue Service may inadvertently create. In the court's
opinion, principles of equality, when established by Congress, out-
weigh any arguments concerning the practical administrative problems
of the Internal Revenue Service.35 This appears to be the trend, and
this trend will have a beneficial effect by instilling in the public
a greater sense of confidence in the fairness of the tax system. This
case may appear to be an opening in the court's policy of refusing to
allow reliance by one taxpayer on another taxpayer's private ruling.
Actually, the court ignored this narrow point and viewed the problem
in the light of the public policy that a fair tax system must strive to
correct its own mistakes and provide equality of treatment, with
judicial control acting as a remedy for administrative caprice. In the
words of the court, "curbing tax collection in the interest of equality,
where Congress has so decreed, is as much a part of the internal
revenue laws as the affirmative exaction of taxes."35
34. See Caplin, supra note 1, for his discussion of the advantages of tax rulings.
35. For the viewpoint of the Internal Revenue Service concerning mandatory rulings,
see id. at 8-9.
36. 343 F.2d at 919.
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Taxation-Federal Income Taxation-Attorneys' Fees
Incurred in the Unsuccessful Defense of a
Criminal Prosecution Deductible Under Section 162
The taxpayer, engaged in the business of underwriting public stock
offerings, was convicted of violating the fraud section' of the Securities
Act of 1933. He subsequently claimed that the legal fees incurred in
his unsuccessful defense were "ordinary and necessary"2 business
expenses and therefore deductible from his gross income. The Com-
missioner disallowed this deduction, and his ruling was sustained by
the Tax Court.3 On appeal, held en banc, reversed. Attorneys' fees
incurred in the unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution arising
out of the conduct of a business are deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under section 162 of the Internal Revenue
Code. Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965).
In the leading case of Commissioner v. Heininger4 the Supreme
Court held that legal fees incurred in unsuccessfully defending against
a civil fraud order forbidding the taxpayer's business from using the
mails were deductible under section 162 as "ordinary and necessary,"
since, regardless of the trial's outcome, taxpayer's response to the
threat to his business was that ordinarily to be expected.5 The Court
added that it would not allow the deduction if to do so would
frustrate a sharply defined public policy of the state or federal govern-
ment. It concluded, however, that the primary policy of the fraud
order statute was to protect the public rather than punish violators.6
While Heininger makes it certain that the deductibility of legal fees
incurred in civil actions arising out of a taxpayer's trade or business
is not affected by the taxpayer's success in that suit, all federal courts
of appeaF have long held that legal fees incurred in the defense of a
criminal prosecution arising out of the taxpayer's trade or business are
not deductible unless the taxpayer is successful in his defense. 8 Two
reasons have been advanced for denying deductibility where the
1. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
3. Walter F. Tellick, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1062, 1069 (1963).
4. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
5. Id. at 472.
6. Id. at 474.
7. The Supreme Court has never ruled specifically on the deductibility of legal
fees incurred in the defense of a criminal prosecution.
8. Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T.C. 562 (1956); Estate of Albert E. MacCrowe 14 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 958 (1955); Union Packing Co., 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1188, 1209
(1955); C. W. Thomas, 16 T.C. 1417 (1951). No distinction has been made between
unlawful businesses and lawful businesses unlawfully conducted, attorneys' fees for the
unsuccessful defense being held nondeductible in all instances.
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defense was unsuccessful: that expenses occasioned by unlawful
activities are avoidable and therefore not "ordinary and necessary'
in the conduct of a business, 9 and that allowing a deduction for such
expenses would be contrary to public policy because it would give
governmental sanction to illegal acts. 10 Such a disallowance of legal
expenses has been criticized by numerous commentators on the
ground that in Heininger the Supreme Court said nothing to warrant
a distinction between civil and criminal litigation expenses; it held
simply that litigation expenses are deductible unless their deduction
would frustrate sharply defined governmental policies. Thus, it has
been urged that the deductibility of litigation expenses be determined
by whether they frustrate "sharply defined governmental policies,"
without distinction between civil and criminal cases."
The principal case is the first in any circuit which has actually
allowed a deduction for legal expenses incurred in an unsuccessful
criminal defense.i2 The court noted first that section 162 allows
deduction of "all the ordinary and necessary expenses . . . incurred
... in carrying on any ... business.. ." There is nothing in the statute
which dictates or even suggests that because an expense is incurred
in an unsuccessful criminal defense it cannot be an "ordinary and
necessary" expense.13 In the Senate debate the object of the bill was
explained to be "to tax... what... [a man] ... has at the end of the
year after deducting from his receipts his expenditures or losses ...
not to reform men's moral character." 4 The court also noted that in
Heininger the deduction allowed was for the unsuccessful defense of
a civil fraud action, contending that there was no essential difference
between that situation and the one at bar, in which the legal fees
were incurred in an unsuccessful criminal defense.1 Finally, the
court reasoned that to deny the deductibility of the legal fees of an
unsuccessful criminal defense would itself be contrary to public
policy since it would discourage the hiring of counsel in defense
against a criminal charge. In fact, the court noted that it is highly
doubtful whether such a policy could exist in the face of the sixth
9. See, e.g., National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878,
880-81 (2d Cir. 1937).
10. See, e.g., Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d
Cir. 1931).
11. See, e.g., Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12 TAx L. REV. 241
(1957); Keesling, illegal Transactions and the Income Tax, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 20
(1958); Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 132-36 (1962). It has also been suggested that
the disallowance of criminal litigation expenses actually frustrates the policy of the sixth
amendments guarantees of the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions.
12. Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965).
13. Id. at 692-93.
14. 50 CONG. Rxc. 3849 (1913).
15. Supra note 12, at 693-94.
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amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel.
It is submitted that the instant opinion is correct in surmising that
the Supreme Court will eventually hold that section 162 requires
that attorneys' fees incurred in the unsuccessful defense of criminal
prosecutions arising out of business transactions be deductible. Section
162 does state that all ordinary and necessary business expenses are
deductible, and gives no indication that legal fees incurred in criminal
defenses are not "ordinary and necessary." In truth, no real distinc-
tion has been shown between legal fees incurred in a Heininger-type
civil suit and those incurred in a criminal action, and therefore it
would seem that Heininger will require deductibility. Surely the Con-
gress did not enact the Internal Revenue Code for the purpose of
stifling economic activity. If a taxpayer could reasonably believe his
business activities to be lawful, should he be penalized because that
belief is tested in a criminal case rather than a civil case? It would
seem not. An affirmative answer is seriously undercut by the co-
existence of civil and criminal remedies dealing with essentially the
same conduct, in such diverse fields as libel, antitrust and fraud. The
converse of this is obvious: No deduction should be allowed where
there could be no reasonable belief in the lawfulness of the conduct,
whether tested in a civil or a criminal action. Finally, while it is to
some extent true, that the allowance of the deduction results in a
governmental subsidy of crime, it is also true that to disallow the
deduction would frustrate the sixth amendment's guarantee of right
to counsel. Indeed, does allowing the deduction subsidize crime any
more than providing counsel to indigent defendants?
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Torts-Government Tort Immunity-Statement of a
Cause of Action for Injuries Resulting From
Assault by Police Dog
Plaintiff, an innocent bystander, sued the District of Columbia for
injuries sustained when he was attacked by an unleashed, unmuzzled
police dog, which had been released by a police officer to capture a
fleeing house breaker. The District pleaded that the operation of the
police department was a governmental function, and thus the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff's action. The lower
court on this ground granted summary judgment to the District.
On appeal, held, reversed. The plaintiff has stated a cause of action
and he should be permitted to develop the question of whether the
District of Columbia, as proprietor of a vicious dog, had taken
reasonable precautions to prevent his injuries. Harbin v. District of
Columbia, 336 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has undergone a process of
constant, but slow disintegration. The first assault upon the doctrine
was the judicial distinction made between the public and proprietary
functions of the municipal corporation.' The courts generally recog-
nize that a municipal corporation is not liable to respond in damages
for the negligence of its officers, agents or employees when they are
acting in the discharge of public or governmental functions,2 including
those which relate to education, health, public charities and the
protection of persons and property.3 The municipal corporation, how-
ever, is generally held liable when injury results in the performance
of a proprietary function.4 Proprietary functions are those from which
the municipality derives a substantial revenue, such as the furnishing
of water, light, power and transportation to its inhabitants.5 This
distinction, while it has afforded a remedy to innocent sufferers, has
also led to results often confusing, frequently incongruous 6 and at
times absurd.7 The maintenance and operation of a municipal police
department is universally recognized as a governmental function.
1. See generally Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924);
Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 VA. L. REv. 97 (1932).
2. 18 McQumLEN, MU CIPAL CoRonoNs §§ 53.23- .59 (3d ed. 1950).
3. PRossER, ToRTS § 125 (3d ed. 1964).
4. 18 McQumLEN, op. cit. supra note 2.
5. PnossEn, op. cit. supra note 3.
6. Compare Mocha v. Cedar Rapids, 204 Iowa 51, 214 N.W. 587 (1927) (operation
of bathing beach is governmental function), with Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172
Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939) (operation of swimming pool is a proprietary function).
7. See, e.g., Pleasants v. City of Greensboro, 192 N.C. 820, 135 S.E. 321 (1926)
(dependent on purpose for which plaintiff entered the building).
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Thus, in the absence of a statute,8 ordinarily no liability is imposed on
the municipality for the torts of its law enforcement officers acting
in the line of duty. The immunity has been held to extend to an
unjustifiable assault and battery9 and to negligent police administra-
tion of the jails.10 Some courts have created an exception to the rule,
permitting actions to be maintained where the municipality has
retained a policeman known to be unsuited for his work," or where
there has been inadequate training of a policeman in the use of fire-
arms.12 Two fairly recent decisions have imposed liability for the
failure to protect a police informer 13 and for the suffocation of a
prisoner due to the negligence of the jailer.14
In the instant case the court stated that the general rule of
sovereign immunity for governmental functions still applied, and
remarked that its abolition is not to be undertaken by the judicial
branch.15 However, the court looked at two statutes which the lower
court had failed to consider, one of which imposed liability on an
owner for injuries caused by his dog,16 and the other of which provided
that the District stands in the shoes of a private individual as to the
compromising of claims against the District, irrespective of the
8. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8: "The state hereby waives its immunity from
liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same
determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the
supreme court against individuals or corporations, provided the claimant complies
with the limitations of this article .. ." The courts of New York have applied this
waiver of immunity to all its agencies and political subdivisions. Another example is
the Illinois ,statute which provides for the indemnification of policemen by municipalities
for judgments recovered as a result of injuries to third persons, except when the
injuries result from the policemen's "wilful misconduct." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §
1-4-5 (Smith-Hurd 1962). For a complete summary of all the states, see Leflar &
Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1363 (1954).
9. McSheridan v. City of Talladega, 243 Ala. 162, 8 So. 2d 831 (1942); Craig v.
City of Charleston, 180 Ill. 154, 54 N.E. 184 (1899); Brown v. City of Shreveport,
129 So. 2d 540 (La. App. 1961); Simpson v. Poindexter, 241 Miss. 854, 133 So. 2d
286 (1961). See Shapo, Municipal Liability for Police Torts: An Analysis of a Strand
of American Legal History, 17 U. Mrms L. REv. 475 (1963).
10. Evans v. City of Kankakee, 231 Ill. 223, 83 N.E. 223 (1907) (prisoner put
with carriers of smallpox); Gentry v. Town of Hot Springs, 227 N.C. 665, 44 S.E.2d
85 (1947) (negligence in connection with a jail that burned with prisoners inside);
Valdez v. Amaya, 327 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (failure to provide needed
medical attention).
11. McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947).
12. MeAndrew v. Mularchuk, 56 N.J. Super. 219, 152 A.2d 372 (1959).
13. Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958). It must
be remembered that New York has waived immunity by statute. See note 8 supra.
14. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957). In this case, the
Florida Supreme Court overruled a long line of contrary precedent.
15. 336 F.2d at 952.
16. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 47-2005 (1961) provides that any person owning a dog "shall




performance of a governmental function.'7 By treating the District
as the proprietor of the dog, the court found the District subject to
liability within the meaning of the first statute. The court supported
this conclusion by referring to the second statute which permits the
District to compromise claims that can be brought either under a
statute, such as the "dog statute," or on the authority of previously
decided cases. The court felt that since the District had adopted the
use of trained police dogs as a means of apprehending fugitives,
there was a duty upon it to control those means. Since the District
had permitted a vicious dog to go unleashed, the plaintiff should have
been given the opportunity to show that reasonable precautions were
not taken.'8 In a separate concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Wash-
ington stated that he did not think that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity should be applied to non-human agencies, and that the
District should be liable for the injuries resulting from the use of an
inherently dangerous instrumentality. While conceding that trained
police dogs can be a valuable asset to the police department, he felt
that if proper training and precautions were not taken, the dogs
could create a nuisance by injuring innocent persons.19
The instant decision is another in a growing series of opinions
reflecting the view that the doctrine of sovereign immunity should
be discarded as a relic of the past.20 While this court refused to
abolish the doctrine, it was able to seize upon two statutory provisions
by which it could conclude that liability should be imposed on the
District as the proprietor of the dog.2 ' The court avoids stating forth-
rightly that the doctrine of sovereign immunity for governmental
functions will no longer bar this sort of action; rather, it seems to
imply that the maintenance of trained police dogs is a proprietary
function. Even if there is no statute, the negligent performance of a
proprietary function has long been held to result in liability. The
majority opinion, and more explicitly the concurring opinion, seems
17. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-902 (1961) authorizes the Commissioners to settle claims
asserted against the District of Columbia whenever the cause of action "Arises out of
negligence or wrongful act, either of commission or omission of any officer or
employee of the District of Columbia for whose negligence or acts the District of
Columbia, if a private individual, would be liable prima facie to respond in damages,
irrespective of whether such negligence occurred or such acts were done in the
performance of a municipal or a governmental function of said District. . ....
18. 336 F.2d at 953.
19. ibid.
20. A citation of cases would be futile, therefore the reader is directed to a few
of the leading articles which describe the injustice of the doctrine. Borchard, Govern-
mental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); (pt. VI), 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926);
(pt. VII), 28 CoLUm. L. REv. 577 (1928); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corpo-
rations, 4 ILL. L.Q. 28 (1921); Tooke, supra note 1.
21. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-902, 47-2005 (1961).
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to premise its decision on the theory of nuisance, a well-recognized
exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity,22 by stating that
the benefit to be derived from the use of trained police dogs might
be overcome by the possibility of serious injury to members of
the public if reasonable precautions are not taken. As in many
other cases, the court's attempt to find a nuisance is actually based
upon nothing more than negligence, for which the municipality
is not liable.23 In the maintenance and operation of non-human
agencies, the court has, by declining the opportunity to strike down
the barrier of immunity in toto, created another tenuous classification
which is typical of this area of the law.24
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been in effect for over a
century and a half, and with such impressive authority facing them,
courts are naturally reluctant to overturn this well-entrenched rule.
Furthermore, most courts feel that overruling this authority is tanta-
mount to "judicial legislation." Such reluctance is not entirely without
justification, for when sovereign immunity is abolished by the judici-
ary, questions relating to the extent and basis of liability are left
unanswered. Of real concern if liability is extended to all municipal
agencies, is the problem of what is to be done about injuries arising
from the negligent performance of "discretionary" functions? This is
a principal fear of the municipality-that the discretionary acts of its
officials will be subject to examination by the judiciary, a result which
could adversely affect the proper performance of their duties.25 Un-
doubtedly, however, the chief concern of the municipality is the heavy
burden that might be imposed upon the public treasury if immunity
is abolished. In light of these two overriding interests of the munici-
pality on the one hand, and on the other the obvious injustice inherent
in the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the reluctance of courts
to abrogate it, various legislative solutions have been proposed. The
use of liability insurance,26 for example, would necessitate statutory
authorization since the majority of courts have held that the purchase
22. See PRossEn, op. cit. supra note 3; McQuiLLEN, op. cit. supra note 2.
23. The origin of the theory seems to be that the creation of a private nuisance
amounted to a taking of land without compensation, or that the city, as landowner,
was necessarily a proprietor and subject to the responsibilities of one toward other
landowners. The futile attempts to distinguish between nuisance and negligence have
caused considerable confusion among courts. See PRossua, op. cit. supra note 3.
24. These tenuous distinctions have been vigorously attacked by Professor Edwin
Borchard. See authorities cited in notes 1 & 19 supra.
25. A critical view of this argument is taken in 7 Duxs L.J. 142 (1958). "It is at
least arguable that such a doctrine might rather tend to insure a more circumspect
performance of duties and an increased selectivity and training of municipal employees."
Id. at 146.
26. See Gibbons, Liability Insurance and the Tort Immunity of State and Local
Government, 8 DuKE L.J. 588 (1959).
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of liability insurance without this authorization is ultra vires and a
wasteful dissipation of public funds.27 A second suggestion is legisla-
tive action establishing a rule of tort liability against the municipality
but limiting recovery to pecuniary loss. To effectuate this legislation,
a well-formulated plan of administrative settlement of tort claims has
been proposed.28 If the boards which would be set up under such a
plan were efficiently administered, they could save both the time and
expense that result from bickering over these claims and the question
of immunity. A properly functioning administrative board could also,
by the speedy disposition of "nuisance suits," prevent their interfering
with governmental functions. A third alternative would be a statutory
enactment similar to the Federal Tort Claims Act,29 by which a maxi-
mum amount could be set for injuries to person and property. As in
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the statute should expressly exclude the
municipality from liability for the intentional torts of its officers,
agents and employees.30 The statute should also exclude "discre-
tionary" functions, as does the federal statute, because many situations
can be contemplated where a municipal officer has to act with
alacrity, and his judgment, if at all reasonable, should not be subject
to subsequent judicial scrutiny. With the ever-increasing activities of
municipal corporations it is not unreasonable to say that the settle-
ment of tort claims is a necessary expenditure of municipal funds.
The remote possibility of a heavy drain on the public treasury is not
a sufficient argument to deny redress for injuries inflicted upon in-
nocent citizens. The doctrine of sovereign immunity can not be
squared with our modern sense of justice, and while it is preferable
27. Hartford Ace. Indem. Co. v. Wainscott, 41 Ariz. 439, 19 P.2d 328 (1933);
Burns v. American Cas. Co., 127 Cal. App. 2d 198, 273 P.2d 605 (1954); Adams v.
City of New Haven, 131 Conn. 552, 41 A.2d 111 (1945); Adkins v. Western & So.
Indem. Co., 117 W. Va. 541, 186 S.E. 302 (1936).
28. Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 H~Mv. L. Rrv. 437
(1941).
29. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2680 (1964). The claims authorized are for a "negligent
or wrongful act or omission" of employees acting within the scope of their govern-
mental employment. The act specifically excludes acts done in connection with
"discretionary" functions. It also excludes a list of intentional torts: assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. Professor Edwin
Borchard has drafted a model statute along similar lines. Borchard, State and Municipal
Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform, 20 A.B.A.J. 747, 752, 793-94 (1934). See
generally Antieau, Statutory Expansion of Municipal Tort Liability, 4 ST. Louis U.L.J.
351 (1957); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Lawmaking in a
Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REv. 163 (1963).
30. Admittedly, such an exclusion could still work hardship on an injured plaintiff;
for even though he will still have a cause of action against the individual, it may prove
difficult to collect a judgment.
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that the legislature act, the courts should not be reluctant to act
if the legislature fails to do so.31
31. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is of judicial origin. Russell v. Men of
Devon, 2 Term. Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). Thus, it has been argued that
the judiciary is competent to abolish the doctrine. The argument of judicial abrogation
was made to the California Supreme Court in Muskopf v. Coming Hospital Dist., 55
Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961), and was accepted. It would seem, however, that
once the courts begin to abrogate sovereign immunity, the legislatures, heretofore slow
to act, will undoubtedly be prompted to define the scope of liability and limit the
amount of recovery.
